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IN THE STATIONHOUSE 
AFTER DICKERSON 
Charles D. Weisse/berg* 
INTRODUCTION 
Miranda v. Arizona1 established the high water mark of the protec­
tions afforded an accused during a custodial interrogation. During the 
decades that followed, the United States Supreme Court allowed 
Miranda's foundation to erode, inviting a direct challenge to the 
landmark ruling. In Dickerson v. United States,2 the Court turned back 
such a challenge and placed Miranda upon a more secure, constitu­
tional footing. This Article explores the impact of Dickerson in the 
place where Miranda was meant to matter most: the stationhouse. 
As I have described elsewhere, Supreme Court decisions have in­
fluenced a number of California law enforcement agencies to instruct 
officers that they may continue to interrogate suspects in custody who 
have asserted their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent or right to 
counsel.3 Harris v. New York" and Oregon v. Hass5 permit some state­
ments taken in violation of Miranda to be used for impeachment pur­
poses at trial. Michigan v. Tucke-I' and Oregon v. Elstad7 permit some 
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Clinical Education, University of 
California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall) School of Law. - Ed. 
I am grateful to Evan Caminker, Margaret Dundon, Richard Leo, Kay Levine, Robert 
Post, Mark Rosenbaum, Stephen Sugarman, and participants at the University of Michigan 
Law Review's Symposium and Boalt Hall's Center for Social Justice workshop for their ad­
vice and assistance. I owe particular debts to Yale Kamisar for inspiring me (and others) to 
study interrogation practices and to Andrew Stein for first introducing me to police training 
in California. 
Together with my colleagues and students, I have served as co-counsel for the plaintiffs­
appellees in Cal. Att'ys for Crim. Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1999) and for amici 
curiae in People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212 (Cal. 1998) and Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 
2326 (2000). A law student, Victoria Wong, argued Butts under my supervision. My work in 
these cases has shaped many of my views, but the opinions expressed here (and, of course, 
any errors) are my own. 
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000). 
3. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 126-40 
(1998). 
4. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
5. 420 U.S. 714 (1975). 
6. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
7. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
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derivative use of such statements.8 These rulings together with 
other decisions labeling Miranda's procedures as merely "prophylac­
tic"9 - have created incentives for police to disregard Miranda and 
have led to a different way of thinking about its core holding. Propo­
nents of this different view, which I have called the "new vision" of 
Miranda,10 have claimed that Miranda sets forth a nonconstitutional 
rule of evidence that need only be followed when officers seek a 
statement to introduce in the prosecution's case-in-chief at trial. 1 1  By 
transforming Miranda from an affirmative constitutional command 
governing conduct in the stationhouse into a weak rule of evidence, 
the new vision has encouraged officers to continue to question sus­
pects who have asserted the right to counsel or the right to remain si­
lent. During the last decade, the practice has become so pervasive in 
some jurisdictions that it has acquired its own moniker: questioning 
"outside Miranda."12 
· 
This Article argues that Dickerson firmly rejects the "new vision" 
and asks whether the ruling may foster new respect for Miranda and 
adherence to its commands. The Article explores the Court's reaf­
firmation of the constitutional basis for Miranda and discusses the ef­
ficacy of exclusionary rules and civil rights actions in enforcing 
Miranda's procedures. Most police officers are not lawyers and do not 
read advance sheets. Court decisions can influence officers' conduct 
only if the holdings are accurately transmitted to them. This Article 
thus examines how law enforcement officials are instructed following 
Dickerson and other recent Miranda cases, and explores whether offi­
cers are likely to follow their training. 
Part I briefly reviews interrogation training in the last decade, par­
ticularly in California, and discusses the holdings in Dickerson and 
three other recent Miranda decisions from lower courts, including one 
civil rights action. Part II examines the instruction of officers in 
California in the wake of these cases. Although the training is not uni­
form, and may not be given in all parts of California, officers are now 
being encouraged to comply with Miranda. It appears to have taken a 
palpable threat of civil liability and, perhaps, Dickerson to force this 
change. Part III discusses the conditions under which the new training 
may actually alter interrogation practices in the stationhouse. The 
Article argues that the new training may prove effective if law en-
8. In Tucker, the Court declined to suppress the testimony of a trial witness whose iden­
tity was discovered through a statement in violation of Miranda. 417 U.S. at 450. In 
Elstad, the Court ruled that a statement given after proper warnings would not be sup­
pressed as the fruit of an earlier unwarned statement. 470 U.S. at 309. 
9. E.g. , Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446. 
10. Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 132. 
11. See id. at 132-40. 
12. See id. at 133-37. 
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forcement supervisors themselves take Miranda's commands seriously 
and work to change norms within their departments. Finally, the 
Article explores the use of civil rights actions to vindicate Miranda 
rights after Dickerson and concludes that the risk of civil rights liabil­
ity is important in changing departmental norms. 
I. INTERROGATION PRACTICES, THE COURTS AND DICKERSON 
A. Questioning "Outside Miranda" in California 
Before describing police practices in California, one might ask 
whether it is worth examining what occurs in a single state and 
whether California's practices have spread to other jurisdictions. 
There is some evidence of Miranda noncompliance outside of 
California,13 though I have not undertaken to examine training in 
other jurisdictions and I make no claims about the prevalence of ques­
tioning "outside Miranda" elsewhere. Nevertheless, even in the event 
that questioning "outside Miranda" is confined to California, 
California is the nation's most populous state14 and has the largest 
criminal justice system of all the states.15 Whether or not California's 
police practices are representative of those in other jurisdictions, 
California has a large chunk of the nation's criminal investigations and 
prosecutions, and what happens in California is therefore significant in 
its own right. 
Consistent with the "new vision" of Miranda, many police officers 
in California have been trained during the last decade that Miranda's 
rules are merely nonconstitutional "recommended" or "suggested" 
guidelines that must be followed only when officers seek a statement 
13. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 137-38 (collecting cases); see also United States v. 
Acosta, 111  F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (describing plan by FBI agent to ignore 
requests for counsel); Hendrickson v. State, 688 S.W.2d 295 (Ark. 1985) (officers deliber­
ately questioned over an invocation of the right to counsel); State v. Burris, 679 A.2d 121, 
124-25 (N.J. 1996) (police interrogated suspect despite clear invocation of right to counsel); 
State v. Sosinski, 750 A.2d 779, 782-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (prosecutors in­
structed officers not to Mirandize suspect so that he would think he was not in custody); 
Peter Erlinder, Getting Serious About Miranda in Minnesota: Criminal and Civil Sanctions 
for Failure to Respond to Requests for Counsel, 27 WM . MITCHELL L. REV. 941, 964-67 
(2000) (describing refusal of FBI agent to respect assertion of right to counsel). 
14. In 2000, the population of California was 33,871,648, 12% of the total population of 
the United States. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Thi. 2, Resident Population of the 50 States, 
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico: Census 2000, available at http://www.census.gov/­
population/www/cen2000/respop.html#t2 (last visited Apr. 20, 2001). 
15. In 1998, California law enforcement officials made 1 ,565,431 nontraffic arrests (15% 
of the 10,291,317 nontraffic arrests made by all the states), including 340,602 arrests for FBI 
index crimes (19% of the 1 ,774,193 arrests for FBI index crimes made by all states). See FED. 
BUREAU OF INVEST., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIF. CRIME REPS., CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1998) tbl. 30 (Arrests, Number and Rate) & tbl. 69 (Arrests by State). "Index" 
crimes include murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated as­
sault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft and arson. 
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that will be admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief at trial.16 This 
training has been promulgated by state law enforcement agencies, 
such as the Attorney General's office and the California 
Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training ("POST"). 17 
The instruction has also occurred in counties and cities within 
California, though it is also true that some agencies have rejected the 
practice and have told officers to respect a suspect's Miranda invoca­
tion.18 Despite the efforts of some agencies to urge respect for 
Miranda, "outside Miranda" training has had a significant impact in 
California, as demonstrated by the reported cases with "outside 
Miranda" issues.19 This training has led to several legislative efforts at 
reform, which have not yet proved successful.20 
"Outside Miranda" instruction emphasizes that Miranda describes 
only a value-neutral rule of evidence; it does not embody a constitu­
tional command. Thus, there is nothing legally or morally wrong in in­
terrogating a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel or the right 
to remain silent. Questioning over an invocation merely has an eviden­
tiary consequence at trial.21 It is therefore perfectly legitimate to ques-
16. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 133-37. In Tucker, the Court called Miranda's safe­
guards "recommended" and "suggested," though it is clear from the context that the Court 
did not mean that Miranda's procedures could be unilaterally scrapped. See Tucker, 417 U.S. 
at 443-44. 
17. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 133-34. POST is part of the California Department 
of Justice. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13500 (2000). It develops training programs and stan­
dards for law enforcement officers. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13503(e) (2000), 13510(a) 
(2000 & Supp. 2001), 13511  (2000 & Supp. 2001). 
18. See infra Section Il.C. 
19. See infra Section LB; see also Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 136-37. There are no em­
pirical studies showing the prevalence of this practice in police departments throughout 
California. In 1992-93, however, Richard Leo observed 182 interrogations conducted by po­
lice in three northern California departments. Suspects invoked their rights in thirty-eight 
interrogations. Officers continued to question "outside Miranda" in seven of those thirty­
eight cases (18%). See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276 (1996). 
20. In 1999, a bill was introduced in the California State Assembly declaring "the intent 
of the Legislature" that officers cease questioning a suspect in custody who has invoked his 
or her Miranda rights. A.B. 1326, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal., as amended Jan. 14, 2000). The 
bill was voted out of committee but died while Dickerson was pending in the Supreme 
Court. On March 19, 2001, another bill was introduced in the California State Senate with 
the same declaration, but also with a provision to prohibit "outside Miranda" training. See S. 
B. 1211 ,  2001-02 Reg. Sess. (Cal., as amended May 15, 2001). The bills and their histories are 
available at http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset2text.htm (last visited May 29, 2001). 
21. See, e.g., CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA PEACE OFFICERS LEGAL 
SOURCEBOOK § 7.40a (Rev. Mar. 1997) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK] (on file with author) 
("An uncoerced (voluntary) statement obtained 'outside' Miranda (without complying with 
Miranda) may not be used during trial as part of the prosecutor's case-in-chief . . . .  However, 
it can be used during the 'rebuttal' portion of the trial to impeach a defendant . . . .  "); id. , 
§ 7.40b ("[T]he Miranda decision is not a code of conduct setting forth how police must con­
duct their investigations in the field . . . .  Rather, the Miranda opinion simply sets out a 'series 
of recommended "procedural safeguards''. . .  .' ") (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 443-44); 
Videotape: Questioning: "Outside Miranda" (Greg Gulen Productions 1990), transcript re-
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tion a suspect even after she has asserted her Fifth 
Amendment rights, to obtain additional information (such as the loca­
tion of physical evidence, the names of witnesses, the identities of ac­
complices, or the accused's methods of operation) or to force the de­
fendant to commit to a statement that will prevent her from asserting 
a new defense at trial. Of course, any such statement cannot itself be 
used in the case-in-chief at trial. But, in the words of a proponent of 
this tactic, "you can accomplish all of these legitimate purposes that 
don't have anything to do with the prosecution of the case, and some 
that do, by talking to the guy 'outside Miranda. '  "22 Officers trained in 
this fashion perceive no downside to questioning "outside Miranda." 
Investigators who respect an invocation of a suspect's rights and stop 
questioning will obtain no information from a suspect. On the other 
hand, questioning over an invocation may yield useful information, 
even if that information has a limited use at trial. 
I have argued elsewhere that this theory and training is not faithful 
to the language, history, or purposes of Miranda.23 Nor does it cohere 
with Edwards v. A rizona,24 which holds that an accused who has "ex­
pressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel . . .  is 
not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has 
been made available to him" unless the suspect reinitiates contact or 
communication with the officers.25 A significant number of law en­
forcement trainers, however, have not read Miranda or Edwards to 
bar such continued questioning.26 
printed in Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1 91 :  
The Miranda exclusionary rule is limited to the defendant's own statement out o f  his mouth. 
That is all that is excluded under Miranda. It doesn't have a fruits of the poisonous tree the­
ory attached to it the way constitutional violations do. When you violate Miranda, you're not 
violating the Constitution. Miranda is not in the Constitution. It's a court-created decision 
that affects the admissibility of testimonial evidence and that's all it is. So you don't violate 
any law. There's no law says [sic] you can't question people "outside Miranda." You don't 
violate the Constitution. The Constitution doesn't say you have to do that. It's a court deci­
sion. So all you're violating is a court decision controlling admissibility of evidence. So 
you're not doing anything unlawful, you're not doing anything illegal, you're not violating 
anybody's civil rights, you're doing nothing improper. The only consequence of your talking 
to somebody who has invoked his rights is "we will not be able to use his statement in the case 
in chief in trial against him. 
22. See id. at 192. 
23. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 122-25, 140-53, 162-67. 
24. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
25. Id. at 484-85; see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) (holding that 
Edwards' protection does not cease once a suspect actually consults with counsel). 
26. This narrow reading of Miranda and Edwards is not confined to law enforcement. 
See Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing 
Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 907, 916-28 (1989) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment can only be violated at trial and, 
hence, courts should care only about the admission of Miranda-violative statements, not 
whether Miranda is breached in the stationhouse). 
1126 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:1121 
B. Lower Court Rulings and Questioning "Outside Miranda" 
Because so many officers have been instructed that it is permissible 
to interrogate "outside Miranda,'' a series of cases challenging this 
practice have reached the state and federal courts. Along with 
Dickerson, these decisions have �ignificantly affected formal police 
training in California. 
1 .  People v. Peevy 
A number of defendants have argued to California state courts 
that statements taken in deliberate violation of Miranda and Edwards 
should not be admissible for impeachment under Harris v. New York 
and that the tactic of questioning "outside Miranda" was sufficient to 
render their statements involuntary under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. An involuntary statement is inadmissible for any pur­
pose, including impeachment.2 7 Most intermediate appellate courts to 
face the issue have strongly criticized the practice of questioning "out­
side Miranda."28 But not all intermediate appellate courts agreed. In 
People v. Branscombe,29 the court endorsed the "new vision" of 
Miranda, holding that " [p]olice officers are presented with a choice -
they may cease questioning upon defendant's invocation of the right 
to remain silent or they may continue their discussion with the suspect 
and therefore lose the benefit of that evidence in the prosecution's 
case-in-chief. "30 
The question reached the California Supreme Court in 1998 in 
People v. Peevy.31 Airreque Peevy was arrested for attempted robbery 
27. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978). 
28. See, e.g., In re Gilbert E., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866, 868 (Ct. App. 1995) ("When the po­
lice deliberately step over the line and disobey Supreme Court pronouncements, respect for 
the rule of law necessarily diminishes."); People v. Bey, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 28, 30-31 (Ct. App. 
1993) ("This is a very troubling case, presenting a deliberate police violation of Miranda 
coupled with a misrepresentation to appellant about the legal consequences of that viola­
tion."); People v. Montano, 277 Cal. Rptr. 327, 337 (Ct. App. 1991) ("No tolerance can be 
given to the officers' flagrant trampling of defendant's rights, particularly because (officers] 
began the interrogation with no intention of respecting those rights." (footnote omitted)); 
People v. Baker, 269 Cal. Rptr. 475, 478 (Ct. App. 1990) ("Fortunately, the trial court here 
was well aware of the unlawfulness of the police conduct and stated that it intended to initi­
ate steps to prohibit the San Diego Police Department from using ["outside Miranda"] pro­
cedures in the future."). 
29. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773 (Ct. App. 1998), depublished, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 4252 (June 24, 
1998). 
30. Id. at 778. 
31. 953 P.2d 1212 (Cal. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1042 (1998). In a death penalty case 
decided a year earlier, the California Supreme Court noted that officers had questioned the 
defendant after his request for counsel. See People v. Bradford, 929 P.2d 544 (Cal. 1997). 
The court criticized the officers, stating that their conduct "was unethical and it is strongly 
disapproved." Id. at 567. 
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by San Bernardino County sheriff's deputies, who questioned him af­
ter he asked for an attorney.32 One deputy testified that "I kept talking 
with him for impeachment purposes."33 Peevy's "outside Miranda" 
statement was later used to impeach him at trial.34 
On May 7, 1998, the California Supreme Court unanimously ruled 
that the Harris exception applies even when a statement is taken in 
deliberate violation of Miranda and Edwards.35 Peevy did not assert 
that his statement was involuntary; consequently, that issue was not 
addressed.36 The court also left open the question whether a statement 
would still be admissible for impeachment if there was proof of a 
widespread practice on the part of the police to ignore a Miranda in­
vocation.3 7 
Though Peevy permits the impeachment use of a statement taken 
deliberately "outside Miranda," all seven justices also unequivocally 
rejected the claim that Miranda and Edwards merely establish a value­
neutral rule of evidence that may be disregarded at an officer's elec­
tion. Those cases impose "an affirmative duty upon interrogating offi­
cers to cease questioning once a suspect invokes the right to coun­
sel. . . .  Nothing in the language of Harris or Oregon v. Hass, for 
example, suggests that the court now considers the Miranda or 
Edwards rules as constituting mere advice regarding preferred police 
conduct."38 The court declared that a statement is excluded under 
Miranda and Edwards because "the evidence was obtained illegally"39 
and described questioning after an invocation as "police miscon­
duct."40 Soon thereafter, the justices also "depublished" Branscombe, 
removing its ability to serve as precedent.41 
Peevy filed a petition for writ of certiorari. In its response, the 
California Attorney General asked the U.S. Supreme Court to take 
32. See Peevy, 953 P.2d at 1215. 
33. Id. 
34. See id. at 1216. 
35. See id. at 1219. Part of the reason for the holding is that, under the California 
Constitution, statements taken in violation of Miranda may be excluded only to the extent 
required by the federal Constitution. See id. at 1214. 
36. See id. at 1221 n.2. 
37. See id. at 1225-28. The court declined to take judicial notice of "outside Miranda" 
training materials because the issue of police training was not raised in the trial court and 
because the materials did not specifically pertain to the San Bernardino County Sheriff's of­
fice. See id. at 1227 n.4. Justice Stanley Mosk wrote separately to indicate that if the defen­
dant had established that he was questioned pursuant to a policy to violate Miranda, his 
statement would not be admissible under Harris. See id. at 1228-32 (Mosk, J., concurring). 
38. Id. at 1224 (citation omitted). 
39. Id. at 1225. 
40. Id. 
41. People v. Branscombe, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 4252 (June 24, 1998). An unpublished 
opinion "shall not be cited or relied on by a court or a party." CAL. R. er. 977(a). 
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the case and "once and for all clarify that non-coercive non­
compliance with Miranda does not constitute 'illegal' or 'unlawful' 
conduct."42 On December 7, 1998, the Court denied the petition.43 
Peevy contains an unambiguous statement from California's high­
est court, decrying the practice of questioning over a Miranda invoca­
tion. But the overall message to officers was muddied. By holding that 
statements taken in deliberate violation of Miranda are still admissible 
for impeachment, the court left wholly intact the incentive for officers 
to continue to violate Miranda and, perhaps, gave the impression that 
state courts would be willing to look the other way. 
2. Henry v. Kernan 
As one might also expect, issues about these interrogation prac­
tices eventually reached the federal circuit court. On May 26, 1999, the 
court of appeals decided Henry v. Kernan,44 reversing the denial of a 
habeas corpus petition in a second-degree murder case. Henry was in­
terrogated by Sacramento County sheriff's deputies after he asked for 
counsel. Shaken, confused and frightened, he gave a rambling and 
disjointed statement, which was used to impeach him at trial.45 
In granting relief, the Ninth Circuit noted that the officers' refusal 
to honor Henry's invocation "was designed to generate a feeling of 
helplessness," and "it was successful."46 The court concluded that "the 
slippery and illegal tactics" of the officers overcame Henry's will and 
made his statements involuntary and thus inadmissible for any pur­
pose.4 7 In addition to questioning after his invocation of the right to 
counsel, one of the deputies misled Henry about the effect of a state­
ment, saying that "what you tell us we can't use against you right 
now . . . .  We'd just would like to know."48 
The State sought rehearing in Henry, arguing that Henry's state­
ments were voluntary up to the point that the misleading assurances 
were given. Denying rehearing, the court strengthened its opinion, 
42. Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Peevy v. California (No. 98-6125) 
(Nov. 6, 1998). Professor Paul G. Cassell and the Washington Legal Foundation also asked 
the Supreme Court to take the case, stating that "[a]mici are deeply concerned that the con­
clusion below about the 'illegality' of noncoercive questioning outside of the Miranda rules 
will unnecessarily discourage police officers from questioning suspects . . . .  " Brief of Amici 
Curiae Washington Legal Foundation et al. at 2, Peevy v. California (No. 98-6125) (Nov. 12, 
1998). 
43. Peevy v. California, 525 U.S. 1042 (1998). 
44. 177 F.3d 1 152 (9th Cir. 1999), amended by 197 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 
528 U.S. 1198 (2000). 
45. See Henry, 197 F.3d at 1025, 1027. 
46. Id. at 1028. 
47. Id. at 1027-28. 
48. Id. at 1029. 
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underscoring that the sheriff's deputies "set out in a deliberate course 
of action to violate Miranda."49 The Supreme Court subsequently de­
nied the State's petition for writ of certiorari.50 
Henry should have sent a strong signal that questioning "outside 
Miranda" is impermissible and may jeopardize a prosecution. Officers 
who question over a Miranda invocation run the risk that a court will 
find any resulting statements involuntary because of the psychological 
impact of this practice upon a suspect. At the same time, however, be­
cause Henry broke down during the interrogation and was told that 
his statements could not be used against him, some might read the 
case as a limited holding about false promises and voluntariness. 
3. California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts 
In 1995, a federal civil rights lawsuit was filed against officers in the 
Los Angeles and Santa Monica Police Departments, and against those 
respective cities, seeking to stop police from questioning "outside 
Miranda." The plaintiffs in California A ttorneys for Criminal Justice v. 
Butts51 were two associations of criminal defense lawyers and two indi­
viduals who had been questioned in violation of Miranda and 
Edwards. Both individual plaintiffs were interrogated after they une­
quivocally sought counsel. In April 1996, the federal district court 
dismissed the portion of the case brought by the two bar associations, 
finding that they lacked standing to seek injunctive relief.52 The court 
permitted the case to go forward on behalf of the two individual plain­
tiffs, rejecting the defendants' claim that Harris permits officers to 
question "outside Miranda" to obtain impeachment information.53 The 
case subsequently went to the court of appeals on the officers' inter­
locutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity.54 
49. Id. The court also emphasized that under the California Evidence Code, statements 
admitted for impeachment are also admitted for the truth of the matters asserted. Id. (citing 
CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1220, 1235). 
50. Kernan v. Henry, 528 U.S. 1 198 (2000). 
51 .  922 F. Supp. 327 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
52. See id. at 330-34. 
53. See id. at 336 ("The impeachment exception was certainly not intended to provide 
the police with the option of either ceasing questioning or continuing onward in the hopes of 
acquiring impeachment evidence."). 
54. The district court considered cross motions for summary judgment. The court nar­
rowed the case by dismissing the Fourteenth Amendment causes of action, but held that the 
plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claims should go to trial. See Order Re: Cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment Argued August 11 ,  1997, at 2-5, Cal. Att'ys for Crim. Justice v. Butts 
(CV 95-8634-ER) (Aug. 26, 1997); Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Adjudication; Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal; and 
Granting Defendants' Request for Stay Pending Appeal on Qualified Immunity Issue at 2-6, 
Cal. Att'ys for Crim. Justice v. Butts (CV 95-8634-ER) (Oct. 16, 1997). In so ruling, the court 
reaffirmed its previous denial of qualified immunity to the defendant officers. See Order re: 
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, supra, at 5. 
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On November 8, 1999, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of 
qualified immunity.55 The court determined that the plaintiffs had al­
leged constitutional claims. Although " [i]n the narrowest sense" 
Miranda "is a prophylactic rule, not a constitutional right," Miranda 
"cannot be viewed entirely apart from the constitutional rights that it 
protects."56 Moreover, while under circuit authority a bare violation of 
Miranda may not be enough to establish a §  1983 action, the two plain­
tiffs additionally alleged that officers made assurances that the plain­
tiffs' statements could not be used against them and, in one case, deni­
grated the role of counsel.57 The court also ruled that the 
constitutional right was clearly established and that reasonable officers 
should have known that their actions violated the plaintiffs' Miranda 
rights.58 Echoing Peevy, the court expressly rejected the claim that 
Harris v. New York, Oregon v. Hass and Michigan v. Tucker affirma­
tively permit officers to question suspects who have invoked their 
rights: "The Supreme Court has never suggested . . .  that these deci­
sions dealing with the peripheral use of statements obtained in viola­
tion of Miranda somehow overcame Miranda's imperatives concerning 
proper police procedure."59 Finally, and perhaps most significant to of­
ficers in California, the circuit found that police could not escape li­
ability by arguing that they relied upon their "outside Miranda" 
training in good faith.60 The court concluded that " [o]fficers who inten­
tionally violate the rights protected by Miranda must expect to have to 
defend themselves in civil actions."61 
The officers sought Supreme Court review. The Court denied their 
petition for a writ of certiorari on June 26, 2000,62 the same day that 
Dickerson was decided. 
55. 195 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2717 (2000). 
56. Id. at 1045. 
57. See id. at 1046-48. The court followed an earlier case, Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 
1220, 1244 (9th Cir. 1992) (en bane), where a §  1983 action was permitted to go forward on 
behalf of a former suspect who was questioned in violation of Miranda and subjected to abu­
sive tactics. The Cooper court noted that "[t)his case does not establish a cause of action 
where police officers continue to talk to a suspect after he asserts his rights and where they 
do so in a benign way." Id. By ruling that the claim should go to trial in Butts, the court de­
termined that the plaintiffs had at least alleged that the questioning "outside Miranda" was 
not "benign." 
58. See Butts, 195 F.3d at 1047. 
59. Id. at 1048. 
60. See id. at 1049 ("[T]hat Los Angeles and Santa Monica may have trained their police 
to violate the rights of individuals does not provide any defense for these officers. Their pol­
icy contradicts the safeguards provided by Miranda, and, at the very least, is in direct conflict 
with Cooper [v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992) (en bane))."). 
61. Id. at 1050. 
62. Butts v. McNally, 120 S. Ct. 2717 (2000). 
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In some respects, Butts is factually similar to Henry: In both cases, 
officers told the suspects that because they invoked their Miranda 
rights, their statements could not be used against them. Thus, some 
might also read Butts narrowly for the proposition that questioning 
over a Miranda invocation, coupled with false promises, violates the 
Constitution. But that is not a fair reading of the case. Butts strongly 
rejects the notion that Harris, Hass and Tucker allow officers to elect 
to question "outside Miranda."  Further, if a simple violation of 
Miranda is not by itself a Fifth Amendment violation and additional 
conduct - some sort of "plus" - is needed, Butts and Henry together 
indicate that that "plus" need not be much. And Butts makes clear 
that officers who err do so at their personal peril. 
C. Dickerson v. United States 
The tale is by now familiar. 
In 1968, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act, a provision of which sought to replace Miranda in federal 
prosecutions. Under that provision, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501, a 
voluntary confession "shall be admitted."63 The statute also provides 
that the judge shall consider a variety of factors to determine volun­
tariness, including whether or not the accused was advised of the right 
to remain silent and the right to the assistance of counsel.64 Though 
these circumstances are to be taken into consideration, they "need not 
be conclusive."65 In this respect, the statute sought to replace Miranda, 
which makes its regime of warnings and waiver conclusive, at least as 
to the admissibility of a statement in the case-in-chief. 
The statute lay fallow for years, for the most part unenforced by 
the Department of Justice and ignored by the courts.66 In February 
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1995). 
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b} (1995) provides: 
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the 
circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing be­
tween arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after 
arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense 
with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confes­
sion, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to 
make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or 
not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of 
counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when 
questioned and when giving such confession. 
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into considera­
tion by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession. 
65. Id. 
66. For various accounts of the treatment of the statute, see Paul G. Cassell, The Statute 
That Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 
197-225 (1999); Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 883, 925-28 (2000); Michael Edmund O'Neill, Undoing Miranda, 2000 BYU L. REV. 
185, 233-50. 
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1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit accepted the 
invitation of Professor Paul Cassell and the Washington Legal 
Foundation to resurrect the law in an interlocutory appeal from an or­
der suppressing evidence. The court held that § 3501 was constitu­
tional, and that Charles Dickerson's statement should be admitted 
into evidence because it was voluntary.6 7 The Supreme Court reversed. 
On June 26, 2000, in Dickerson v. United States,68 the Supreme 
Court held by a 7-2 vote "that Miranda, being a constitutional decision 
of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of 
Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves."69 Writing 
for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the lower court's reli­
ance upon the fact that the Supreme Court had created several excep­
tions to Miranda's warnings requirement and that the Court had "re­
peatedly referred to the Miranda warnings as 'prophylactic,' . . .  and 
'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution. '  " 70 
Conceding "that there is some language in some of our opinions that 
supports the view," the justices disagreed with the court of appeals' 
conclusion that Miranda's protections are not constitutionally re­
quired. 71 Addressing the "public safety" and impeachment exceptions 
described in New York v. Quarles72 and Harris v. New York, the ma­
jority claimed that " [t]hese decisions illustrate the principle - not that 
Miranda is not a constitutional rule - but that no constitutional rule is 
immutable." 73 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, 
tearing at the majority for "its carefully couched iterations that 
'Miranda is a constitutional decision,' that 'Miranda is constitutionally­
based,' [and] that Miranda has 'constitutional underpinnings.' " 74 Ac­
cording to Justice Scalia, the Court fell short of stating that an un­
warned custodial interrogation violates the Constitution "because a 
majority of the Court does not believe it," perhaps suggesting that the 
majority was disingenuous in its internal reasoning. 75 He accused the 
Court of engaging in extraconstitutional "power-judging. " 76 
67. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999). 
68. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000). 
69. Id. at 2329. 
70. Id. at 2333 (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984), and Michigan v. 
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)) (footnote omitted). 
71. Id. 
72. 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
73. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335. 
74. Id. at 2337 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
75. Id; see also id. at 2343 (asserting that the Court did not address the claim that 
Miranda establishes a constitutional prophylactic rule "because, I assume, a majority of the 
Justices intent on reversing believes that incoherence is the lesser evil"). 
76. Id. at 2337. 
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The dissenters have something of a point: The majority could have 
held that a violation of Miranda is a per se violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. But such a ruling would have required the Court to deal 
more directly with the impeachment and public safety exception cases, 
which are premised at least in part on the notion that a Miranda viola­
tion is not a core constitutional violation. The majority also attempted 
to distinguish Oregon v. Elstad,77 which refused to exclude the testi­
monial fruit of a Miranda violation, claiming that "[o]ur decision in 
that case . . .  does not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional deci­
sion, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under 
the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation 
under the Fifth Amendment."78 This is fairly unsatisfying, inasmuch as 
the fruits doctrine applies to other types of Fifth Amendment trans­
gressions79 and probably to Fourteenth Amendment violations as 
well;80 moreover, the majority in Elstad said that Miranda's exclusion­
ary rule "may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment 
violation."81 Further, the Court has created a weaker rule of exclusion 
for statements taken in violation of Miranda than for other types of 
compelled testimony and for statements that violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment.82 For that reason, concluding that breaches of Miranda 
77. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
78. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335. 
79. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) ("(I]mmunity from use and 
derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and 
therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of privilege.") (emphasis added). 
I am not alone in criticizing the Court's clumsy handling of Elstad. See Paul G. Cassell, 
The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court's Failures in Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 901 
(2001); Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, 
and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1073 
(2001); see also Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 
2000 SUP. er. REV. 61, 80 n.79. Some courts also have had difficulty determining whether 
Dickerson undermines the holding in Elstad. Compare State v. Walton, No. Wl998-00329-
SC-Rll-CD, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 222, at *37 (Tenn. Mar. 15, 2001) (holding that Dickerson 
did not overrule Elstad), with People v. Trujillo, No. 98CA2575, 2000 Colo. App. LEXIS 
2213, at *5-6 (Colo. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2000) (ruling that Dickerson distinguished Elstad, and 
applying the "fruits" doctrine to bar impeachment of defense witnesses). 
80. The Supreme Court has apparently never directly faced the question whether the 
fruits of an involuntary statement must be excluded, though it has come close. In Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978), the Court declared that "any criminal trial use against a 
defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law." In Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 300 (1991), the Court found that the use of an involuntary state­
ment harmed the defendant for several reasons, including that it made other highly­
damaging evidence relevant and, thus, admissible. For a discussion of the reasons why the 
fruits doctrine should apply to Fourteenth Amendment violations, see Yale Kamisar, On the 
"Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 929 (1995). 
81. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306. 
82. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 
(1978). Portash distinguishes Harris and holds that testimony given under a grant of immu­
nity cannot be used for impeachment, because - unlike statements obtained in violation of 
Miranda - testimony obtained under an order of immunity is truly compelled. See 
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are per se Fifth Amendment violations would eventually force the 
Court to choose among three alternatives: (1) enhance the Miranda 
exclusionary rule, (2) adopt different exclusionary rules for different 
types of Fifth Amendment violations, or (3) retreat from earlier hold­
ings that equate Fifth Amendment compulsion with Fourteenth 
Amendment coercion.83 These must have appeared unhappy choices 
for the Dickerson majority, which also sought to rest its ruling on prin­
ciples of stare decisis.84 
Even so, Dickerson should put to rest the claim that Miranda's 
procedures are merely nonconstitutional suggested guidelines, as 
hinted in Tucker and as a number of law enforcement instructors have 
told police. "Congress," the Court held, may "set aside any judicially 
created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the 
Constitution."85 That Congress lacked such authority in this case can 
mean only that Miranda's procedures are indeed required by the 
Constitution. Further, "[t]he Miranda opinion itself begins by stating 
that the Court granted certiorari 'to explore some facets of the prob­
lems . . . of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in­
custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for 
law enforcement agencies and courts to follow. '  "86 "Concrete constitu­
tional guidelines" are more than mere non-constitutional suggestions. 
Dickerson's message to law enforcement is that Miranda's rules are 
here to stay. 
Portash, 440 U.S. at 458-59. Similarly, Mincey distinguishes Harris and Hass and holds that 
the impeachment use of an involuntary statement is a denial of due process. See Mincey, 437 
U.S. at 398. 
83. If Miranda violations are per se violations of the Fifth Amendment, the Court would 
have to abandon the Harris/Hass impeachment exception, overturn Portash, or find some 
other reason for the different outcomes. Likewise, the Court would eventually have to rec­
oncile Tucker and Elstad with Kastigar, and decide whether the "fruits" doctrine applies to 
Fifth Amendment/ Miranda violations as well as to Fifth Amendment/immunity grants. At 
least one justice has suggested that there is a permissible distinction between the use of 
"fruits" in these two situations. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660, 669-672 (1984) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court might also seek to re­
view its earlier rulings equating Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, as some have 
suggested. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 440-
45 (1987). Yet even if such a review led to different rules of exclusion for Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment violations, the Court would still have to reconcile Harris and Hass 
with Portash. 
84. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000). 
85. Id. at 2332. 
86. Id. at 2333-34 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966) (emphasis 
added in Dickerson)). 
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II. RECENT POLICE TRAINING 
A. Uncovering Police Practices 
To assess whether these recent decisions - especially Dickerson 
- may influence police practices in California, I examined on-the-job 
("in-service") law enforcement training materials. Most police officers 
are not lawyers and they do not usually read legal newspapers; thus, 
judicial opinions will not have an impact in the stationhouse unless 
sworn personnel are formally instructed about them. Supporting this 
view, two studies of police and the Fourth Amendment report that in­
service training makes the most significant contribution to officers' 
understanding of search and seizure law.87 Of course, knowledge is not 
the same as practice. Training materials will not alter police behavior 
in the stationhouse unless officers decide to follow them.88 Training is 
thus necessary though not sufficient to alter law enforcement behav­
ior. 
In late August 2000, I sent formal requests to forty-five law en­
forcement offices around the state, seeking their training materials on 
Peevy, Henry, Butts and Dickerson, as well as materials concerning the 
practice of questioning "outside Miranda."89 The requests, made pur-
87. See William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 311 ,  337-38 (1991) (developing regression model based upon answers to surveys of 
officers, and finding that extensive in-service training provided the most substantial explana­
tion for officers' understanding of Fourth Amendment law; other dependent variables in the 
model included college attendance, assignment as supervisor or plain clothes investigator, 
years of service, number of recent arrests, number of recent suppression hearings, and expo­
sure to law suits); L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the 
Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 730-32 (1998) (surveying officers and reporting 
that those with continuing training answered 52.6% of search and seizure hypotheticals cor­
rectly, while those without such training answered 35% correctly; educational background, 
rank and experience did not necessarily affect performance); see also Corey Fleming 
Hirokawa, Note, Making the "Law of the Land" the Law on the Street: How Police 
Academies Teach Evolving Fourth Amendment Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 295, 330-31 (2000) 
(finding, in a study of Atlanta-area law enforcement agencies, that the complexity of search 
and seizure law does not appear to have led departments to decrease their efforts to teach 
procedures that comply with the Fourth Amendment). But see Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deter­
rence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 91-92 (1992) (reporting that, in survey of judges, prosecutors and 
defense lawyers, 51 % of respondents believe that the experience of having evidence sup­
pressed is at least as effective as teaching officers the law). 
88. Heffernan and Lovely also report that, in approximately 15% of the responses, offi­
cers indicated their willingness to search a suspect or a dwelling in deliberate violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. See Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 87, at 346-55. In-service training 
affected the officers' knowledge of the law, but not their willingness to comply with it. See id. 
at 354-55. 
For a fuller discussion of this point, see infra Section III.A. 
89. Appendix A to this Article contains a sample request to a police department. For 
the most part, the same request was sent to each agency, with slight wording changes for dis­
trict attorney and sheriff's offices. 
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suant to the California Public Records Act,90 went to the 
Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, the District At­
torneys and Sheriffs9 1 in fourteen counties, and the Chiefs of 
Police in sixteen large cities.92 I included District Attorneys because 
police often learn about the law from individual prosecutors, even if 
Deputy District Attorneys and their investigators do not themselves 
conduct many custodial interrogations. I collected instructional mate­
rials from POST, the Attorney General's Office, and statewide organi­
zations. I received responses from ten District Attorneys (71 % re­
sponse), nine Sheriffs ( 64 % response), and ten local police 
departments (62.5% response).93 
Section B, infra, describes the training materials issued by POST 
and other statewide entities. I believe that I have obtained a fairly 
comprehensive set of materials distributed by state agencies and 
statewide organizations, and can therefore safely draw conclusions 
about the effect of Dickerson and other cases upon statewide training. 
The materials collected from local agencies are less comprehensive. 
Section C, infra, describes instruction in select counties and cities. 
B. Statewide Training 
1 .  Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training 
The Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training 
("POST"), part of the California Department of Justice, is the most 
active statewide training body for police officers and deputy sheriffs. 
POST approves standard curricula for new officer instruction, and cer­
tifies in-service or advanced officer training. POST also conducts a 
monthly satellite video broadcast with case law updates, and the 
broadcast is downloaded by law enforcement agencies across the 
state.94 
90. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250-6268 (1995 & Supp. 2001). 
91. Felonies are generally prosecuted by the county district attorneys' offices. See CAL. 
Gov'T CODE § 26500 (1988 & Supp. 2001). The Sheriffs departments are county-wide law 
enforcement agencies. District attorneys and sheriffs are elected in each county. See CAL. 
Gov'T CODE §§ 24000, 24009(a) (1988 & Supp. 2001). Most cities in California have their 
own police departments, each headed by an appointed chief, though some incorporated and 
all unincorporated areas rely upon the county sheriff for local law enforcement. See CAL. 
GOV'T CODE §§ 36501, 36505 (1988 & Supp. 2001). 
92. Appendix B to this Article lists the counties and cities that I surveyed and notes 
which agencies responded to the Public Records Act requests. 
93. See infra Appendix B .  
94. The monthly broadcast, formerly titled Case Law Updates, i s  now called Case Law 
Today. Each broadcast contains a series of short topics. For a list of broadcasts and topics, 
see Case Law Today Broadcasts at http://www.post.ca.gov/cptn/casebrod.htm (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2001). 
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It is difficult to overemphasize the impact of POST. Even if many 
officers in an agency do not see the POST materials directly, they are 
usually trained by people who do. Moreover, most detectives and in­
vestigators - who ordinarily conduct the custodial interrogations in 
serious cases - have received advanced interrogation training in 
POST-approved courses.95 Many of these courses are provided by 
trainers outside of the officers' own departments, who may be unfa­
miliar with local policies and practices. Thus, even if a local law en­
forcement agency has a policy of strict compliance with Miranda, de­
tectives and other investigators may receive advanced instruction from 
people operating under a different set of guidelines. 
POST's monthly satellite broadcasts have addressed the recent 
Miranda cases. POST's July 1998 broadcast included a segment on the 
impeachment exception and Peevy.96 The segment reviews Harris, 
Hass, and Branscombe (the depublished decision)97 before turning to 
Peevy. The trainer, a deputy district attorney, reports that a statement 
"is perfectly admissible even though the police officer deliberately 
took it for purposes of impeachment." He then warns that it cannot be 
used for any purpose if it is rendered involuntary by the interrogator 
"assuring the person that it will be off the record and cannot be used 
against them in court. "98 He adds: 
Another caution. You see sometimes the newscasters giving you the 
news and then they want to give you their opinion about that. They want 
to add something that's not the facts, it's just their commentary. And so 
down at the bottom of the screen it says, opinion or commentary. When 
a court does that they call it dicta. They've got their ruling, which might 
be the news, and then they've got their commentary, which is called 
dicta. It means this is not binding on anybody. This is not a statement of 
the law. This is just us expressing our personal opinions about something. 
In Parts B and C of their opinion in Peevy, the California Supreme Court 
expressed its displeasure with the tactic of questioning outside Miranda 
in order to obtain an impeachment statement. They made it very clear 
95. According to a POST analyst, over 7,000 POST-approved training courses are of­
fered each year. See Letter from Anna de! Porto, Associate Analyst, ·POST (Oct. 11 ,  2000) 
(on file with author). A recent catalog of POST-approved courses runs 263 pages. See 
COMM'N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING, POST CATALOG OF CERTIFIED 
COURSES (Sept. 2000). It lists 17 advanced courses on interrogation and interviews from 
POST-approved providers (see id. at 174-76), though many other advanced courses also deal 
with interrogation. The current catalog may be viewed at http://www.post.ca.gov-/catalog/ 
intro.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2001). 
96. See Videotape: Case Law Updates: Questioning "Outside Miranda" for 
Impeachment (Golden West College) (POST July 9, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Videotape 1]. 
97. Branscombe was depublished on June 24, 1998, see supra note 41, two weeks before 
the videotape was broadcast. The videotape segment is undated, and may have been pro­
duced prior to the order depublishing the decision. 
98. Videotape 1, supra note 96. 
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they don't approve of it. They thought in their opinion that it was illegal, 
they said. That's the word that they used, though they were unable to cite 
to a U.S. Supreme Court case, since there isn't one, saying that it's ille­
gal. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently said this is an evidentiary 
rule that will limit use of the statement in court. They have never said it 
is illegal to question without Miranda compliance. Nor, I will bet my 
money, will they ever. But the California Supreme Court in its commen­
tary, in its dicta said, this is illegal, it's improper. 
So before you decide whether or not you want to go outside Miranda and 
take an impeachment statement that will be admissible if it's otherwise 
voluntary, you may want to do what we always caution you to do, seek 
advice from your departmental legal adviser, local prosecutor, city attor­
ney or county counsel, whoever you turn to for advice. I commend you to 
their advice. As to the admissibility of the evidence, a statement deliber­
ately taken outside Miranda, if it's otherwise voluntary, is admissible for 
impeachment, People v. Peevy. You're up-to-date as of now.99 
POST broadcast another segment after the Fourth Circuit's ruling 
in Dickerson.100 The trainer emphasizes that Miranda establishes a 
prophylactic rule, not rights protected by the Constitution, and that if 
Miranda can be preempted by a statute in the federal courts, "it could 
be done state by state by state."101 
After the ruling in Henry v. Kernan, POST broadcast a segment 
warning officers about tactics that may lead to an involuntary state­
ment.102 In this segment, the trainer, a different prosecutor than that 
featured in the two other broadcasts, underscores that repeated 
Miranda violations may amount to badgering and may prevent a 
statement from being used for any purpose. In contrast to the earlier 
broadcasts, he expressly tells officers not to question in violation of 
Miranda: "It isn't worth it. It isn't worth your reputation or the reputa­
tion of your department - much less the potential civil rights liability 
under 42 U.S. Code 1983 - to willfully violate Miranda."103 
Yet another broadcast was issued after the Ninth Circuit's decision 
in Butts, featuring the same deputy district attorney who appeared in 
the videos on Peevy and Dickerson.104 He instructs that a Fifth 
99. Id. 
100. See Videotape: Case Law Updates: Miranda: Beginning to Crumble? (Golden West 
College) (POST May 6, 1999) (on file with author). 
101. Id. He adds that " [T)his could be the beginning of the end of Miranda. I don't want 
to be too optimistic . . . .  But the Fourth Circuit says we are on our way on that mission." Id. 
102. See Videotape: Case Law Today: Miranda: Ignoring Invocation by Upset Subject 
Collapses Case (Alameda County Dist. Attorney's Office) (POST Aug. 5, 1999) (on file with 
author). 
103. Id. 
104. See Videotape: Case Law Today: Civil Liability "Outside Miranda?" Cal. Att'ys for 
Crim. Justice v. Butts (Golden West College) (POST Jan. 13, 2000) (on file with author). 
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Amendment violation can occur only at trial, and that a bare Miranda 
violation is not enough to establish civil rights liability under § 1983. 
He emphasizes that Butts involved allegations of coercive techniques 
in addition to questioning "outside Miranda," and that is why the offi­
cers might be subject to civil rights liability.105 The trainer adds: 
In Oregon v. Elstad, the U.S. Supreme Court said, point blank, a 
Miranda violation does not constitute coercion. So how could the Ninth 
Circuit or anybody else ever come along and say, hmmm, that's enough 
by itself? They couldn't, they haven't - no matter what you have seen in 
the press. No matter what you might hear from people who are running 
around wetting their pants over this thing and saying, oh, the sky is fal­
ling, if we have any kind of non-compliance with Miranda we're going to 
get sued, they are oversimplifying, they are over-reading this case. This 
case says coercive tactics, which you should never use under any circum­
stances anyway, combined with questioning outside Miranda, could 
mean you have to stand trial. Doesn't mean you're liable. Could mean 
you have to stand trial. You don't get out on summary judgment motion. 
You don't get out on qualified immunity. Procedural issue. 
But all of these cases have said, from the U.S. Supreme Court and even 
from the Ninth Circuit, they have said, there is no cause of action, there 
is no constitutional violation where all police are alleged to have done is 
continue to question somebody after a Miranda invocation.106 
As of March 2001, POST has not broadcast a segment on the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Dickerson.107 
As noted, POST also certifies law enforcement training pro­
grams.108 In the wake of Dickerson, POST's executive director issued a 
memorandum to all "POST Certified Training Presenters," empha­
sizing respect for Miranda and stating that POST's policy is that no of­
ficer shall continue to interrogate a suspect over a Miranda invoca­
tion. 109 The director's message, however, was undone by a sentence in 
the last part of his memorandum: "Procedures related to the 'im­
peachment' exception are a matter of local policy and are referred to 
each independent agency for clarification."1 10 It is difficult to predict 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. See POST Case Law Today Broadcasts, available at http://www.post.-ca.gov/cptn/ 
casebrod.htm. 
108. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13510.1, 13511.3, 13519.9 (2000). 
109. Memorandum from Kenneth J. O'Brien, Executive Director, Commission on Peace 
Officer Standards and Training to POST Certified Training Presenters 1 (Aug. 14, 2000) (on 
file with author). 
110. Id. The memorandum provides: 
Recently the United States Supreme Court ruled that Miranda procedures were a "constitu­
tional rule" and that Congress could not supersede the safeguards established by the court 
decision legislatively. The Court preserved the defendant's Fifth Amendment protections es-
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how the hundreds of POST-certified trainers will instruct officers in 
light of this memorandum. 
2. California Attorney General's Office 
The California Department of Justice publishes the California 
Peace Officers Legal Sourcebook ("the Sourcebook"), which is widely 
used by prosecutors and police, including many law enforcement 
trainers. Portions of the Sourcebook were provided by a number of 
departments that responded to the request for training materials. The 
Sourcebook contains a section titled "Deliberately Ignoring an Invoca­
tion," which has been substantially revised in the wake of Peevy, Butts 
and Dickerson. 
Prior to the Peevy decision, the Sourcebook opined that a volun­
tary "outside Miranda" statement should be admissible for impeach­
ment, noting that "the Miranda decision is not a code of conduct set­
ting forth how police must conduct their investigations in the field." 1 1 1  
After Peevy, the section was revised to explain that the California 
Supreme Court held that evidence taken in deliberate violation of 
Miranda could be used for impeachment.112 The Sourcebook also ref­
erences the part of the decision that calls such tactics "illegal," but 
questions this holding and characterizes it as dicta. 1 13 This section of 
the Sourcebook concludes that " [i]t may take a decision from the 
United States Supreme Court to finally settle this question and resolve 
the apparent conflict between the dicta in Peevy and federal law."114 
Another portion of the Sourcebook emphasizes that "nothing in the 
Id. 
tablished in Miranda. Certified POST curriculum has always included a "respect" for the 
protections established in the Miranda decision and a prohibition against illegal or improper 
misconduct. As a result of the recent reaffirmation of the rights established in the Miranda 
decision, the following points need to be repeated as the Commission's policy: 
• No officer shall intentionally violate Miranda by continuing to interrogate a suspect af­
ter they have invoked their right to counsel or to remain silent. 
• No officer shall engage in any conduct that can be concluded to be "coercive" including 
making false promises following the invocation of Miranda rights. 
Procedures related to the "impeachment" exception are a matter of local policy and are re­
ferred to each independent agency for clarification. The POST Commission is committed to 
compliance with the "spirit" as well as the letter of the Supreme Court's ruling. 
1 1 1 .  SOURCEBOOK , supra note 21, § 7.40a-b (Rev. Mar. 1997). 
1 12. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, § 7.40a (Rev. July 1998) (on file with author) 
(noting that an "outside Miranda" statement "may be used to impeach the defendant re­
gardless whether the police non-compliance with Miranda's procedures was negligent (acci­
dental) or intentional"); id. § 7.48b ("[I]f you fail to comply with the Miranda guidelines in a 
non-coercive way, although any statement you obtain will be inadmissible at trial to prove 
guilt (i.e., in the prosecution's 'case-in-chief), that is the only 'penalty.' The statement will 
be admissible in rebuttal to impeach . . .  ; you can also use the statement for any other pur­
pose.") (citations omitted). 
1 13. See id. § 7.40b. 
1 14. Id. 
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Miranda decision is constitutionally required," noting that "if you fail 
to comply with the Miranda guidelines in a non-coercive way, although 
any statement you obtain will be inadmissible at trial to prove guilt 
(i.e., in the prosecution's 'case-in-chief'), that is the only 'penalty.' "115 
Following the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Henry and Butts, the 
Attorney General's Office began to hedge. The Sourcebook notes that 
there were coercive aspects to the questioning in those cases but that 
Henry could also be read to hold that a deliberate violation of 
Miranda is itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment. 1 16 Further, the 
Sourcebook remarks that: 
[R)eview by the United States Supreme Court will be sought in both 
Henry and Butts. In the meantime, however, it is understandable that 
many departments in this state have instructed their officers to strictly 
comply with Miranda's procedures, at least pending further develop­
ments, not the least of which will be the high court's upcoming decision 
in the Dickerson case. 117 
The ruling in Dickerson and the denials of certiorari in Henry and 
Butts led the Attorney General's Office to change its training. The 
Sourcebook was revised to read: 
[A] deliberate or intentional violation of Miranda is an extremely risky 
tactic in California at this time, not so much because of Dickerson, but 
rather because of the Ninth Circuit, which has ruled that a deliberate 
Miranda violation, in combination with almost any other or additional 
conduct which the court also views as "coercive," will: 
' _  render any subsequently obtained statement "coerced," "involun­
tary'' and therefore inadmissible for any purpose, including impeach­
ment; and 
- entitle the suspect to sue for a civil rights violation under the Fifth 
Amendment for which the offending officer(s) can be found personally 
liable! 1 18 
Thus, "the 'bottom line' now must be: do not intentionally violate 
Miranda, in particular, do not ignore an invocation of the right to si­
lence or counsel. This is because an intentional violation will virtually 
guarantee a civil rights lawsuit against you and your depart­
ment. . . .  "119 Further, following Dickerson, the Sourcebook also 
stepped away from its earlier teaching that nothing in Miranda is con­
stitutionally required, noting that "a majority of Justices characterized 
1 15. Id. § 7.48b. 
1 16. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, § 7.40b (Rev. Jan. 2000). 
1 17. Id. § 7.40c. 
1 18. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, § 7.40c (Rev. Sept. 2000) (emphasis in original). 
119. Id. § 7.40d (emphasis in original); see also id. § 7.86 (stating that even a noncoercive 
Miranda violation may result in civil rights liability where it is intentional and done in com­
bination with some other conduct). 
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[Miranda's] 'prophylactic' procedures as being 'constitutionally based' 
and therefore amounting to a 'constitutional rule' (although still 
clearly not part of the Constitution itself) ."120 
3. Statewide Organizations 
The California District Attorneys Association ("CDAA'') pub­
lishes a monthly training bulletin, Did You Know . . .  , with occasional 
articles about Miranda. Prior to Peevy, at least one article encouraged 
officers to question "outside Miranda," noting that "since Miranda is 
not of constitutional dimension, officers risk no civil liability . . . .  In-
stead, they have 'little to lose and perhaps something to gain . . .  . '  "121 
After Peevy, Henry and Butts, the bulletin took the opposite tack, 
printing an article that states that Henry and Butts have blurred the 
distinction between a Miranda violation and Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment violations, and cautioning that "[w]e must remember that 
courts are uniformly critical of intentional Miranda violations as a law 
enforcement tactic and that we, as officers of the court, should not be 
encouraging this practice."122 Following Dickerson, the bulletin has 
emphasized that Miranda is a constitutional rule, noting, 
Except for the increased likelihood of officers being held civilly liable for 
intentional violations of the Miranda rule - a practice we as prosecutors 
should be discouraging anyway - Dickerson v. United States does not 
really do much more than dash the hopes of all those who thought 
Miranda might just go away. Otherwise, courtesy of the Supreme Court, 
plan on business as usual for the unforeseeable future.123 
In addition, the CDAA also publishes a treatise on Miranda that is 
widely distributed to prosecutors.124 The treatise contains a compre­
hensive and straightforward summary of the relevant law, describing 
the impeachment exception but also the full ruling in Peevy and the 
120. Id. § 7.48a. 
121. Devallis Rutledge, Questioning "Outside Miranda," in DID You KNOW . . . 1995, 
at 4 (Cal. Dist. Attorney's Ass'n, DID You KNOW . . .  Series, June 1995) (on file with author) 
(quoting Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1244 (9th Cir. 1992), and Oregon v. Hass, 420 
U.S. 714, 723 (1975)). 
122. Robert C. Phillips, Miranda and the Constitution, in DID You KNOW . . .  2000, at 2 
(Cal. Dist. Attorney's Ass'n, DID You KNOW . . .  Series, Feb. 2000) (on file with author); see 
also Robert C. Phillips, After a Miranda Invocation: The Interrogator's Options, in DID You 
KNOW . . .  2001 , at 1 (Cal. Dist. Attorney's Ass'n, DID You KNOW . . .  Series, Jan. 2001) (on 
file with author) (describing other circumstances in which police may permissibly reinitiate 
interrogation after an invocation, and stating that prosecutors "probably have a professional, 
if not ethical, duty to discourage law enforcement" from questioning "outside Miranda"). 
123. Robert C. Phillips, Miranda Lives, in DID You KNOW . . .  2000, at 3 (California 
Dist. Attorney's Ass'n, DID You KNOW . . .  Series, July 2000) (on file with author). 
124. ROBERT C. PHILLIPS, MIRANDA AND THE LAW (1999). 
March 2001] In the Stationhouse After Dickerson 1143 
circumstances that may lead courts to rule that statements are involun­
tary and inadmissible for all purposes.125 
The California Peace Officers' Association regularly distributes 
training bulletins that are collected from agencies throughout 
California. In August 2000, the Association distributed a bulletin not­
ing that up until the Fall of 1999, officers in California had been in­
structed that it was appropriate in some cases to question over a 
Miranda invocation.126 The bulletin reviews the Butts and Dickerson 
decisions and states: 
On June 26, 2000, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the re­
quirement of Miranda and refused to review the "Butts" case . . . .  
Despite good faith differences of opinion, the issue is now settled; police 
are not permitted to continue questioning suspects who invoke their 
Fifth Amendment Rights without facing potential personal liability, as 
well as the inadmissibility of any statements which might be elicited 
thereafter . . . .  
It is now, more than ever, imperative that officers be aware of the United 
States Supreme Court ruling and know that Miranda Warnings shall be 
given to custodial suspects prior to interrogation and all questioning shall 
cease when Miranda Rights are invoked in any fashion, and at any time 
prior to or during the interrogation.127 
C. Local Training 
1. District Attorneys' Offices 
The county district attorneys' offices vary greatly in their Miranda 
training. For example, in the wake of the California Supreme Court's 
ruling in Peevy, the Los Angeles District Attorney's office issued a di­
rective to all prosecutors and investigators, stating: "It is the policy of 
this office that deputy district attorneys shall not advise any law en­
forcement officer to continue to ask questions for the purpose of ob­
taining "impeachment" evidence after a suspect has invoked his 
Miranda rights."128 By contrast, a bulletin prepared by a leading 
trainer in the Orange County District Attorney's Office reports that 
statements taken in deliberate violation of Miranda are admissible for 
125. See id. at 144-48, 163-68. 
126. See CAL. PEACE OFFICERS' ASS'N, TRAINING BULL. SERV., MIRANDA UPDATE ­
QUESTIONING "OUTSIDE" MIRANDA 1 (Aug. 2000) (on file with author). "Fall of 1999" 
most likely refers to the ruling in Butts. 
127. Id. (emphases in original). 
128. Special Directive 98-02 from Robert P. Heflin, Chief Deputy District Attorney, to 
All Deputy District Attorneys and All District Attorney Investigators 1 (June 18, 1998) (on 
file with author) (original language in bold). 
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impeachment.129 The author opines that the result should be the same 
even if there were to be a proven policy of non-compliance with 
MirandaY0 Obliquely referring to the portion of the Peevy opinion 
that calls such tactics "illegal" and "misconduct," the newsletter con­
cludes: 
In what a constitutional scholar from the Criminal Justice Legal 
Foundation has charitably described as "unfortunate dictum," the Peevy 
court delivered itself of some additional statements of its understanding 
of the nature of Miranda . . . that will be open to serious dispute if they 
should ever form the basis of a ruling. Meanwhile, like they say down 
home, "If you've caught the fish, don't fret about losing the bait."131 
The training materials produced by the different county prosecu­
tors are not easily categorized. The responses to the Public Records 
Act requests leave the overall impression that many county prosecu­
tors have been quicker and more certain than their statewide counter­
parts in cautioning against questioning "outside Miranda," but instruc­
tion is not uniform among counties and, indeed, may not be consistent 
even within a single given county. 
Two counties, Alameda and San Diego, have promulgated par­
ticularly extensive training materials, which appear to be widely dis­
tributed both inside and outside of those counties. It is worth describ­
ing their training documents in detail. 
a. A lameda County. 132 The Alameda County District Attorney's 
Office produces several sets of in-house training materials. It publishes 
written case updates four times a year, called Point of View. It has 
also, until recently, produced videotapes with case updates, also called 
Point of View. 133 In addition, the Office publishes a manual, California 
Criminal Investigation. 
The written Point of View series has occasionally discussed ques­
tioning following a Miranda invocation. A 1993 article addresses the 
admissibility of statements taken in violation of Miranda, but does not 
encourage such questioning. 134 Later, the California Supreme Court's 
129. See ORANGE COUNTY DIST. ATTORNEY, GOOD TO KNOW . .  . ,  IMPEACHMENT 
WITH POST-INVOCATION STATEMENTS 1-2 (May 1998) (on file with author). The same 
trainer appeared in the POST videotapes following the Peevy and Butts decisions. 
130. See id. at 2. 
131. Id. (original in brackets). 
132. Alameda is a large, urban county in northern California that includes the City of 
Oakland. The population of Alameda County and Oakland as of April 2000 are 1,443,741 
and 399,484, respectively. The population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau and are 
available at http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Apr. 20, 2001). 
133. The videotapes are distributed to police agencies; Alameda County prosecutors do 
not watch them. E-mail from William M. Baldwin, Assistant District Attorney to 
Charles D. Weisselberg (Aug. 28, 2000) (on file with author). 
134. See ALAMEDA COUNTY DIST. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, POINT OF VIEW, The Law of 
Police Interrogation; Miranda: Part Two, at 15-16 (Spring 1993) [hereinafter POINT OF VIEW] 
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ruling in Peevy was summarized in Point of View, emphasizing the 
connection between Miranda violations and involuntariness and not­
ing that statements may be excluded for all purposes if taken pursuant 
to a policy of intentionally violating Miranda, but not discussing the 
portion of the decision that labels questioning "outside Miranda" "il­
legal" and "misconduct."135 After the Ninth Circuit ruled in Henry v. 
Kernan, an article again stresses that "outside Miranda" questioning 
may make a statement involuntary.136 Following the ruling in Butts, 
Point of View extensively discusses the case and concludes: "In light of 
this decision and others that have preceded it, there is only one thing 
to say about 'going outside Miranda': DON'T."137 Most recently, ac­
cording to the District Attorney's Office, "Dickerson should put an 
end . . .  " to questioning "outside Miranda" because the ruling rejects 
the claim "that Miranda was nothing more than a 'recommended pro­
cedure,' and was not a Constitutional requirement."138 
The Point of View videotapes, which are distributed to law en­
forcement agencies within the county, appear more receptive to the 
tactic of questioning "outside Miranda,'' at least up until the time of 
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Butts. A videotape on Peevy tells offi­
cers that a statement taken in deliberate violation of Miranda is ad­
missible for impeachment, but does not describe Peevy's condemna­
tion of such questioning. 139 Another videotape describes the holding in 
Branscombe, a case that was depublished two months before the video 
was produced.140 That videotape mildly encourages officers to question 
over a Miranda invocation, noting that even if a statement will have 
only a limited use at trial, it "puts us in a better position" because 
(on file with author). 
135. See POINT OF VIEW, supra note 134, People v. Bey, at 22 (Spring 1994) (on file with 
author) ("It should come as no surprise that the courts are not going to sit by and watch as 
officers conduct custodial interrogations 'outside Miranda' . . . .  We had hoped this issue had 
been put to rest in 1991 when the Court of Appeal published its decision in [another "out­
side Miranda" case]."); see also POINT OF VIEW, supra note 134, People v. Peevy, at 16 
(Summer 1998) (on file with author) (indicating disapproval of the practice). 
136. See POINT OF VIEW, supra note 134, Henry v. Kernan, at 31-32 (Summer 1999) (on 
file with author). The article ends with this noncommittal comment: "Eventually, the legality 
of 'going outside Miranda' will have to be decided by the United States Supreme Court. The 
sooner, the better." Id. at 32. 
137. See POINT OF VIEW, supra note 134, McNally v. Butts et al. [sic], at 21 (Winter 
2000) (on file with author). 
138. Dickerson v. United States, POINT OF VIEW ONLINE, available at http://www.co.­
alameda.ca.us/da/pov/dickerson_2.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2001). 
139. Videotape: Point of View: Evading Miranda; Peevy (Alameda County Dist. 
Attorney's Office, July 7, 1998) (on file with author). The trainer points out that Miranda is 
not a constitutional rule, but officers should not throw away their Miranda cards. Id. 
140. See Videotape: Point of View: Investigation: Beyond Miranda (Alameda County 
Dist. Attorney's Office, Aug. 24, 1998) (on file with author). 
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"[w]e can use it to impeach, which means to disrupt their case."141 
Following the ruling in Henry v. Kernan, another videotape tells offi­
cers that "[y]ou can get stuff to impeach and it is admissible" if volun­
tary.142 But, the trainer warns, "[D]on't push it. We're being given a lit­
tle bit of leeway here."143 The instruction after Butts is markedly 
different. A new trainer notes that he has seen written manuals that 
"have told officers that it's perfectly all right to ignore an unambigu­
ous Miranda invocation" and "it's hard to understand with the courts 
coming down as they have on these cases why it's still going on."144 He 
tells police, unambiguously, that "[a]s far as outside Miranda goes, 
don't do it." 145 
The Alameda County District Attorney's Office investigation 
manual, California Criminal Investigation, expressly instructs that once 
a custodial suspect invokes his right to silence or his right to counsel, 
officers must terminate the interrogation.146 Following the decision in 
Dickerson, the manual was revised to state that questioning "outside 
Miranda" is "[p]robably illegal,'' and that Dickerson has rejected the 
theory that underlies the practice.147 The manual also now cites Butts 
and notes that officers who question "outside Miranda" may be 
sued.148 
b. San Diego County. 149 The CDAA treatise, authored by a San 
Diego deputy district attorney,150 is the main reference for prosecutors 
in the office.151 More recent training for prosecutors reviews Butts, 
141. Id. Further, "if the defendant takes the stand, we may then take these statements 
obtained by going beyond Miranda, not as a result of coercion, but simply going beyond the 
original Miranda concept that we all had and we're now learning is wrong, to keep him from 
getting away with perjury." Id. 
142. Videotape: Point of View: The Limits of "Beyond Miranda; Henry v. Kernman [sic) 
(Alameda County Dist. Attorney's Office, June 15, 1999) (on file with author). 
143. Id. 
144. See Videotape: Point of View: Beyond Miranda Back in Court (Alameda County 
Dist. Attorney's Office, Dec. 6, 1999) (on file with author). 
145. Id. 
146. See ALAMEDA COUNTY DIST. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION 197 (2000) (on file with author). 
147. ALAMEDA COUNTY DIST. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION - INTERNET UPDATE, available at http://www.co.alameda.ca.us/da/cci/ 
-confessions_24.htm (last visited Sept. 2000). 
148. Id. 
149. San Diego is large county in southern California with both urban and rural areas. It 
includes the Cities of San Diego and Oceanside. The populations of San Diego County and 
the Cities of San Diego and Oceanside as of April 2000 are 2,813,833, 1,223,400, and 161,029, 
respectively. The population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau and are available at 
http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Apr. 20, 2001 ). 
150. ROBERT C. PHILLIPS, MIRANDA AND THE LAW (1999). 
151. Telephone Conversation with Craig Rooten, Deputy District Attorney, San Diego 
County (Sept. 8, 2000). 
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Henry and Dickerson at length and states that prosecutors should not 
advise officers to violate either the Constitution or the dictates of the 
state and federal courts.152 The training outline provides that 
Dickerson is a reaffirmation of Miranda, "with the possible exception 
of an increased likelihood of civil liability for police officers (and 
prosecutors who advise intentional violations).  " 153 
The District Attorney's Office regularly publishes a legal update 
for law enforcement agencies within San Diego County.154 The issue 
after Peevy reviews the holding, and also acknowledges that the Court 
found that officers have an affirmative duty to cease questioning upon 
an invocation.155 The update states that "[l]aw enforcement agencies 
should not be teaching or encouraging a 'systematic policy' of violat­
ing Miranda."156 The publication tells police about the circuit court 
ruling in Dickerson, advising that it has no direct effect here but may 
foreshadow change. 157 The publication is critical of the ruling in Henry, 
arguing that the court improperly determined that a calculated plan to 
violate Miranda violates the Constitution.158 Following Butts, the 
District Attorney's Office noted that local law enforcement agencies 
are being encouraged by legal advisors to issue a directive not to ques­
tion over an invocation. That directive is "overly broad" because offi­
cers can question over an invocation where several established excep­
tions apply.159 At the same time, the update provides that: 
[U]nless you're working within one of the recognized exceptions to the 
Miranda requirement (e.g. "public safety exception" or "rescue doc­
trine,'' etc.), do not purposely violate Miranda. Although neither the U.S. 
nor the California Supreme Court has ever held that an intentional 
Miranda violation by itself implicates the Constitution, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has told us not to do it and the California Supreme 
Court, in Peevy . . .  has referred to it as "illegal." And you can bet your 
152. See Robert C. Phillips, Miranda: An Update 3-7 (Oct. 9, 2000) (unpublished manu­
script, on file with author). 
153. Id. at 15. 
154. In addition to the office's formal legal updates, some individual prosecutors work­
ing with specific law enforcement agencies have distributed their own bulletins. See, e.g. , 
David J. Lattuca, Legal Update 1 (Nov. 1999) (on file with author) (discussing Butts) ; David 
J. Lattuca, Legal Update 1-2 (May 1998) (on file with author) (discussing Peevy) . 
155. See SAN DIEGO DIST. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, D.A. LIAISON LEGAL UPDATE, 
Miranda, at 3 (May 1998), available at http://www.clew.org/legalupdate (last visited Mar. 1 ,  
2001) [hereinafter D.A. LIAISON LEGAL UPDATE]. 
156. Id. at 4. 
157. See D.A. LIAISON LEGAL UPDATE, supra note 155, Case Law: Miranda, at 1-2 
(April 1999). 
158. See D.A. LIAISON LEGAL UPDATE, supra note 155, Case Law: Miranda, at 5 (Oct. 
1999). 
159. See D.A. LIAISON LEGAL UPDATE, supra note 155, Administrative Notes: Miranda 
and Civil Liability, at 1 (Nov. 1999). 
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boots the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal will somehow torture the facts 
to find some way to hold you liable.160 
After the Court decided Dickerson, officers were told that Miranda 
imposes a constitutional requirement. 161 "However," the publication 
adds, " . . .  contrary to the fears of some, this case does not do much 
more than create potential civil liability for intentional Miranda viola­
tions; something the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has been trying to 
warn us about for some time anyway."162 
2. Sheriffs and Police Departments 
County sheriffs' offices and city police departments are influenced 
by outside training materials. In response to the Public 
Records Act requests, many local law enforcement agencies disclosed 
or referred to statewide training materials (such as the 
Sourcebook or POST videos) as well as bulletins issued by district at­
torneys' offices. Training officers sometimes distribute these items di­
rectly to police. Sometimes they use them to create their own docu­
ments. Thus, even when detectives and patrol officers receive in­
service instruction from trainers within their own departments, outside 
training materials are quite influential. And many departments send 
their officers to outside courses, thereby relinquishing control over the 
content of their officers' training. 
Because the statewide instruction is not consistent, police depart­
ments that make use of these materials may fail to provide clear guid­
ance to their officers. As an example, one police department in San 
Diego County gives the district attorney's legal updates to officers, but 
also requires them to view the POST videos.163 The legal updates are 
much more critical of questioning "outside Miranda" than the POST 
videos; thus, officers trained with both would not hear a consistent 
message. 
Moreover, as aiready noted, detectives and investigators routinely 
attend advanced programs on interrogation and other topics that are 
conducted outside of their respective agencies. These programs may 
instruct on tactics that are contrary to the policies of the officers' 
home departments. This is illustrated by a broadcast issued by the Los 
Angeles County Sheriff to all deputies, pre-dating Peevy, stating, 
160. Id. at 3-4. 
1 61. See D.A. LIAISON LEGAL UPDATE, supra note 155, Case Law: Miranda, at 3 (July 
2000). 
162. Id. at 4. 
163. Copies of the updates as well as the POST videos were produced by the Oceanside 
Police Department in response to the Public Records Act Request. See also 
E-mail from Sgt. Tom Bussey, Oceanside Police Dep't, to Charles D. Weisselberg (Oct. 17, 
2000) (on file with author). 
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It has come to my attention that training provided by sources outside the 
department may have caused some deputies to believe that it is appro­
priate to continue to question a suspect in custody following an invoca­
tion of his or her rights under Miranda v. A rizona . . . .  
[M]embers of this department are expected to give Miranda warnings to 
a suspect prior to a custodial interrogation, and are expected to termi­
nate that interrogation when a suspect invokes his or her rights.164 
As an additional example of an agency's lack of control over out-of­
house training, a law firm responding to the Public Records Act re­
quest on behalf of the Riverside Sheriff's Department wrote that: 
The sources utilized by a law enforcement agency are too numerous to 
list or provide, and in most instances, the materials are not the property 
of the Riverside Sheriff's Department. In many instances, officers take 
classes at P.0.S.T. approved schools, learning from a P.O.S.T. approved 
curriculum, and the Department is not in possession of the course mate­
rial.16s 
A number of county sheriffs and police chiefs have now issued 
formal directives, telling their officers not to question "outside 
Miranda."  Some of these directives have come at the urging of private 
law firms that represent municipalities and are concerned about civil 
rights liability.166 The orders from agency heads are different in kind 
from in-service training, for they fix the formal policies of the agencies 
and - because such directives are issued infrequently - they signal 
the importance of their message. Given the inconsistent training on 
Miranda in California, sheriffs and police chiefs may issue orders sim­
ply to clarify the duty of officers within the agency. In light of the re­
cent cases, however, the directives may have at least two other aims. 
Peevy left open the argument that statements taken pursuant to a pol­
icy to violate Miranda should be suppressed for all purposes.167 Thus, 
county sheriffs and city police chiefs may issue directives to attempt to 
defeat claims that evidence should be suppressed for all purposes. 
And, of course, under Monell v. Department of Social Services,168 mu­
nicipalities may be subject to civil rights liability for having a custom 
164. Department Broadcast from Sherman Block, Sheriff, Los Angeles County, to All 
Personnel 1-2 (Jan. 29, 1998) (on file with author). 
165. Letter from Diana L. Field, Ferguson, Praet & Sherman, to Charles D. Weisselberg 
2 (Sept. 27, 2000) (on file with author). 
166. See, e.g., Client Alert Memorandum from Martin J. Mayer, Mayer & Coble, to All 
Police Chiefs and Sheriffs (June 30, 2000) (on file with author); Memorandum from Bruce 
D. Praet, Ferguson, Praet & Sherman, to All Chiefs and Sheriffs (June 29, 2000) (on file with 
author); Client Alert Memorandum from Paul R. Coble, Mayer & Coble, to All Police 
Chiefs and Sheriffs (Nov. 17, 1999) (on file with author). 
167. See People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212, 1225-28 (Cal. 1998). 
168. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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or policy that deprives individuals of their civil rights. Directives might 
be issued to avoid municipal liability. 169 
Of the twenty sheriffs' and police departments from which I have 
obtained materials, 170 eleven have issued formal directives telling offi­
cers not to question "outside Miranda."171 The timing of these direc­
tives is revealing. Table 1 ,  below, summarizes the dates of the first 
formal order issued by each department in relation to the recent 
Miranda decisions. Butts appears to have had the greatest influence 
upon the agencies that have decided to issue formal directives, though 
in addition to the directives reflected in Table 1, several agencies have 
issued orders or specific training bulletins after Dickerson and the de­
nial of certiorari in Butts to reconfirm their earlier orders.172 
169. For a discussion of the issuance of policies by police departments in the wake of 
Monell, see JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE 
EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 201-05 (1993). 
170. Nineteen out of thirty sheriffs' and police departments responded to the Public 
Records Act requests. See infra Appendix B. The Los Angeles Police Department did not 
respond, but I have obtained materials from that department through other sources. 
171 . The sheriffs issuing such directives represent the counties of San Bernardino, see 
Interoffice Memorandum from Gary S. Penrod, Sheriff, San Bernardino County, to All 
Station/Division Commanders (July 26, 2000) (on file with author); Notice: Interrogations 
"Outside" Miranda from Gary S. Penrod to All Personnel (undated) (on file with author); 
Shasta, see SHASTA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEP'T, TRAINING BULL. 2000-04, Miranda Update 
(July 2000) (on file with author); Riverside, see Departmental Directive # 00-019 from Larry 
D. Smith, Sheriff, Riverside County, to All Personnel (July 5, 2000) (on file with author); 
Fresno, see FRESNO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEP'T, ROLL CALL TRAINING BULL., Ninth Circuit 
Prohibition of Interrogations "Outside Miranda" (Mar. 29, 2000); and Los Angeles, see 
Department Broadcast, supra note 164. 
The police chiefs issuing the directives were of the cities of Stockton, see Special Order 
No. OO-S-160 from Edward J. Chavez, Chief, Stockton Police Dep't, to All Personnel (Sept. 
6, 2000) (on file with author); Redding, see General Order A-53 from Robert P. Blanken­
ship, Chief of Police, Redding Police Dep't, to All Personnel (July 31, 2000) (on file with 
author); San Jose, see Memorandum from William M. Lansdowne, Chief of Police, San Jose 
Police Dep't, to All Sworn Personnel (Dec. 15, 1999) (on file with author); Bakersfield, see 
BAKERSFIELD POLICE DEP'T, TRAINING BULL., Ninth Circuit Court Prohibition of 
Interrogations "Outside Miranda" (Dec. 1999) (on file with author); Los Angeles, see Notice 
3.3.1 from Bernard C. Parks, Chief of Police, Los Angeles Police Dep't, to All Sworn 
Personnel (Dec. 2, 1999) (on file with author); and Riverside, see General Order No. 99-15 
from Gerald L. Carroll, Chief of Police, Riverside Police Dep't, to All Personnel (Nov. 15, 
1999) (on file with author). 
I have included the training bulletins from the Fresno and Shasta Sheriffs' 
Departments on this list even though they are not, per se, directives from the counties' sher­
iffs, but are rather from others within the sheriff's departments. The bulletins are phrased in 
sufficiently clear and mandatory language that they would be taken as orders by the sheriffs' 
deputies. I have excluded a bulletin from the San Francisco District Attorney to the San 
Francisco Police Department, which asks that officers be advised to stop questioning upon 
an invocation. See Memorandum from District Attorney Terence Hallinan to Police Legal 
Affairs (July 17, 2000) (on file with author). The bulletin was distributed to investigators and 
possibly others in the police department, but is not viewed as a directive from the depart­
ment itself. Telephone Conversation with Lt. Henry C. Hunter, San Francisco Police Dep't 
(Oct. 31, 2000). 
172. See, e.g. , Los ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S D EP'T, FIELD OPERATIONS SUPPORT 
SERVS., NEWSLETTER No. 156, Miranda Warnings, at 1 (Re-released Sept. 2000) (on file 
with author); BAKERSFIELD POLICE DEP'T, TRAINING BULL., Ninth Circuit Court 
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TABLE 1: TIMING OF AGENCY DIRECTIVES, INSTRUCTING 
OFFICERS NOT TO Q UESTION "OUTSI D E  MI RANDA " 
Prior to Peevy173 1 
After Peevy 0 
After Henry 0 
After Butts 7 
After Dickerson 3 
Total 11 
1151 
The departments that have not issued directives to officers offer a 
variety of reasons. Some have provided recent in-service training,174 
and may believe that that instruction will suffice. Others indicate that 
they have never trained officers to question "outside Miranda" and 
thus do not need to issue specific instructions to discontinue the prac­
tice. 175 
Prohibition of Interrogations "Outside Miranda" - Decision Affirmed (July 2000) (on file 
with author); Internal Communication from Sgt. Chuck Lebak, City of Redding, to All 
Sworn Personnel (July 26, 2000) (on file with author); see also Memorandum from District 
Attorney Terence Hallinan to Police Legal Affairs, supra note 171 (characterizing Dickerson 
as settling unequivocally whether questioning "outside Miranda" is permissible, and asking 
San Francisco Police Department to advise officers not to interrogate over an invocation); 
Special Order No. OO-S-160 from Edward J. Chavez, Chief, Stockton Police Dep't, to All 
Personnel, supra note 171 (noting that "the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the Miranda de­
cision in a Virginia case, and let stand a California case that said officers could be personally 
liable for deliberately trampling Miranda rights"). 
173. The Public Records Act requests sought all training bulletins and materials refer­
ring to the practice of questioning "outside Miranda," regardless of date. See infra Appendix 
A. This should have elicited any orders pre-dating Peevy. Only the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff produced any directive telling officers not to question "outside Miranda" prior to the 
decision in Peevy, doing so in January, 1998. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
174. E.g. , Telephone Conversation with Lt. Henry C. Hunter, San Francisco Police 
Dep't (Oct. 31, 2000) (investigators will shortly be trained on Dickerson); Telephone 
Conversation with Lt. Casey Nice, Alameda County Sheriff's Office (Sept. 19, 2000) (depu­
ties received roll-call training on Dickerson and have always been trained that questioning 
"outside Miranda" is risky); Letter from Carol A. Trujillo, Deputy City Attorney, San 
Diego, to Charles D. Weisselberg (Sept. 12, 2000) (on file with author) (officers receive 
monthly legal updates from the district attorney's office). 
175. E.g. , Letter from Matthew Etcheverry, Litigation Unit, Kern County Sheriff's 
Dep't, to Charles D. Weisselberg (Oct. 5, 2000) (on file with author) (department relies 
upon POST's Leaming Domain 16, and does "not deviate from, nor embellish this area of 
the law"); Letter from Lt. Ernie Smedlund, Santa Clara Sheriff's Dep't, to Charles D. 
Weisselberg (Aug. 29, 2000) (on file with author) (training has been not to question suspects 
"outside Miranda" and so "our practice has remained the same as it was prior to the Peevy 
decision"); Telephone Conversation with Sgt. Jeff Israel, Oakland Police Dep't. (Aug. 24, 
2000) (Peevy, Henry, Butts and Dickerson have not affected training because the department 
has not trained officers to question "outside Miranda"). 
1152 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:1 121 
D. Summary 
Though statewide training is not uniform, it has generally changed 
in the wake of the recent Miranda decisions. After the Ninth Circuit's 
rulings in Henry and Butts, both POST and the Attorney General's 
Office softened their positions. POST issued seemingly contradictory 
videotapes: one tells officers not to question in violation of Miranda; 
the other reports on Butts and gives the decision a narrow interpreta­
tion, implying that it is permissible for officers to question "outside 
Miranda" so long as they do so carefully. POST has not broadcast any 
videos on the Supreme Court's opinion in Dickerson, though it re­
ported the Fourth Circuit's ruling. After the Supreme Court decided 
Dickerson (and denied certiorari in Butts) , however, the written train­
ing from POST, the Attorney General and law enforcement organiza­
tions has generally come to counsel adherence to Miranda, with a po­
tentially enormous hiccup: POST has told instructors that 
impeachment exception "procedures" are a matter of local policy. Fu­
ture researchers may wish to study the impact of POST's equivocation 
upon law enforcement officers in California. 
There are significant differences at the county and local level as 
well. Some law enforcement agencies have directed officers not to 
question "outside Miranda." Other agencies may teach police about 
the recent decisions or simply expect officers to learn about the rulings 
in off-site courses. 
One of the most striking aspects of the training materials is simply 
how little changed after the California Supreme Court declared in 
Peevy that questioning "outside Miranda" is "illegal" and "miscon­
duct" and that Miranda and Edwards impose affirmative duties upon 
officers. POST and the Attorney General's Office acknowledged but 
failed to respect the justices' ruling. Neither agency made any effort to 
halt the practice of questioning "outside Miranda." County prosecu­
tors have seemed more willing to instruct their staff and local police to 
follow Peevy and not question in violation of Miranda. With respect to 
county sheriffs and local police, apart from one exception,176 local 
agencies did not appear to direct officers to cease questioning "outside 
Miranda" until after the Ninth Circuit held in Butts that police officers 
"who intentionally violate the rights protected by Miranda must ex­
pect to have to defend themselves in civil actions."177 The ruling in 
Dickerson seems to have reaffirmed this new instruction by undercut-
176. The one exception is the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. See supra note 
164 and accompanying text. 
177. Cal. Att'ys for Crim. Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999). The sam­
ple of county sheriffs and police departments is, however, quite small and it is difficult to 
state this result as more than one researcher's impression. 
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ting any argument that Miranda's procedures are nonconstitutional 
and merely optional. 
There are several troubling explanations for the general malaise 
after Peevy. One is that law enforcement officials felt free to disregard 
Peevy's normative statements because they were not backed with sig­
nificant sanctions. Another is that law enforcement officials disagreed 
with the opinion and were simply waiting for a final ruling from the 
United States Supreme Court.178 The second explanation is disturbing 
because Peevy is a decision from the state's highest court, which rou­
tinely decides constitutional questions. If officials disagreed with the 
ruling, they could have counseled officers to adhere to Miranda and 
Peevy pending a decision from the U.S. Supreme Court. By and large, 
however, officials cited the portion of Peevy that advantaged police 
and ignored the part of Peevy that did not.179 Nor did officials issue 
new training materials after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
Peevy. 
Finally, another striking aspect of the training materials is simply 
that they vary so much. Perhaps this should not be surprising. County 
district attorneys and sheriffs are elected. Police chiefs are appointed 
by local officials. Trainers are, in turn, selected by managers within 
their respective law enforcement agencies. The culture of each agency 
may vary depending upon such factors as leadership from the top, cus­
tom, local crime rates, law enforcement identity with the community 
and resources. The variance in training appears to be a function of lo-
178. In February 2001, my students and I filed a brief in the California Supreme Court 
in a case with a Miranda issue. We pointed out that many law enforcement officials did not 
change their training in the wake of Peevy. See Brief of California Attorneys for Criminal 
Justice, As Amicus Curiae, Supporting Petitioner, at 13-15, People v. Storm (No. S088712) 
(Cal. Sup. Ct.) (filed Feb. 1, 2001). In response, the State Attorney General argued that 
"[w]hile this Court's decision in Peevy clearly foreshadowed the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Dickerson . . .  , which held that Miranda and its progeny were constitu­
tional rules, as opposed to mere rules of evidence, Proposition 8 necessitated guidance from 
the United States Supreme Court before Miranda and its progeny could be viewed as consti­
tutionally based." People's Answer to Amicus Brief in Support of Appellant, at 2, People v. 
Storm (No. S088712) (Cal. Sup. Ct.) (filed Mar. 23, 2001). Proposition 8 is a California initia­
tive passed in 1982. It added a new section to the state constitution providing that "relevant 
evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding." See CAL. CONST., art. I, § 28(d). 
A later initiative, Proposition 1 15, which passed in 1990, amended the California 
Constitution to provide that state courts should not construe the State Constitution to afford 
greater rights than the federal Constitution. See CAL. CONST., art. I, § 24. While these sec­
tions might require a state court to analyze federal constitutional law, neither section pro­
vides that a state court's construction of federal constitutional law should not be authorita­
tive or binding within California. 
179. The apparent lack of respect for the state court's ruling on issues of federal law is 
particularly disconcerting because it comes at a time when Congress has decided to require 
federal courts to defer to state court rulings on issues of federal law that disfavor habeas 
corpus petitioners. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (1) (West Supp. 2000) (habeas corpus relief 
shall not be granted unless the state court's adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision 
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"). 
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cal culture, as well as the energy, creativity and personality of particu­
lar trainers. The difference among trainers and jurisdictions sharply 
contrasts with the justices' perceptions of Miranda and Edwards. The 
Supreme Court is fond of stating that a primary virtue of Miranda and 
Edwards is their clarity and certainty.180 The next part of this Article 
discusses whether Dickerson and the other recent Miranda decisions 
may make this assertion true. 
III. THE STATIONHOUSE AFTER DICKERSON 
A. Exclusionary Rules, Hortatory Statements 
and the Culture of Police 
The Supreme Court's ruling in Dickerson has given Miranda a 
firm, constitutional footing, but has not - at least yet - altered the 
contours of Miranda's exclusionary rule. Statements taken in violation 
of Miranda may still be used for impeachment. Fruits of a Miranda 
violation are still admissible. The public safety exception remains in­
tact. Within the confines of the criminal case, so long as police do not 
take an involuntary statement, officers still have "little to lose and 
perhaps something to gain" by violating Miranda. 181 We have seen that 
police training in California is generally shifting to encourage officers 
to comply with Miranda. But we must then ask whether officers will 
follow their new instructions and actually change what they do in the 
stationhouse. 
For decades, scholars have debated the virtues and vices of shaping 
police behavior through exclusionary rules. In an insightful recent ar­
ticle, Sharon Davies approaches the issue from another perspective. 
Davies explains that an exclusionary rule may, in theory, represent ei­
ther a "price" - a penalty that permits an officer to choose to cause 
harm provided that she internalizes the costs - or a "sanction" - a 
penalty that is attached to conduct that society considers morally 
wrong and seeks to prevent.182 Some of the training materials that en­
courage police to question "outside Miranda" expressly characterize 
Miranda's exclusionary rule as a value-neutral pricing scheme.183 This 
180. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990) ("The merit of the 
Edwards decision lies in the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application."); 
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) ("We have repeatedly emphasized the virtues 
of a bright-line rule in cases following Edwards as well as Miranda."); Fare v. Michael C., 
442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979) ("Whatever the defects, if any, of (the] relatively rigid requirement 
that interrogation must cease upon the accused's request for an attorney, Miranda's holding 
has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in 
conducting custodial interrogation . . . .  ") . 
181. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
182. Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty of Exclusion - A Price or Sanction?, 73 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1275, 1277-79 (2000). 
183. Under this view, there is nothing inherently wrong with questioning "outside 
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characterization matters because sanctions establish normative goals 
and generally also provide greater incentives for compliance, assuming 
that the legal obligation is enforced by a reasonable penalty.184 
Davies argues that Miranda's exclusionary rule is most properly 
seen as a sanction and not a price, 185 and this seems correct after 
Dickerson and the other recent Miranda decisions. Even if officers are 
trained about these decisions, however, Miranda's exclusionary rule 
still provides few incentives for law enforcement compliance. Peevy 
holds that deliberate, pre-meditated violations of Miranda and 
Edwards may nevertheless yield statements that can be used for im­
peachment. Assuming that Dickerson and the other recent decisions 
firmly reject the notion that Miranda and Edwards represent mere 
value-neutral rules of evidence, and that Miranda's exclusionary rule 
is a sanction not a price, the question remains whether the moral force 
of these rulings can carry the day in the stationhouse.186 There may be 
particular reason for skepticism, inasmuch as the hortatory language 
in Peevy went mostly unheeded. The incentive to bring real change in 
the stationhouse must stem from a force other than Miranda's exclu­
sionary rule or judicial declarations about the legitimacy of Miranda, 
even after Dickerson. 
One possibility is that officers may be induced to follow Miranda 
by the fear that deliberate questioning "outside Miranda" may lead to 
an involuntary statement. Officers who violate Miranda and obtain a 
statement that is later ruled involuntary may jeopardize a prosecution 
because the statement and, likely, its fruits will be inadmissible for any 
Miranda." It simply has an evidentiary consequence - a "price" - that may be internalized 
by prosecutors and police. See, e.g. , SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, § 7.48b (Rev. July 1998) 
("(I]f you fail to comply with the Miranda guidelines in a non-coercive way, although any 
statement you obtain will be inadmissible at trial to prove guilt (i.e., in the prosecution's 
'case-in-chief'), that is the only 'penalty.' ") ; SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, § 7.40b (Rev. 
Mar. 1997) ("(T]he Miranda decision is not a code of conduct setting forth how police must 
conduct their investigations in the field."); Videotape, supra note 21, transcript reprinted in 
Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 191 ("[Miranda is] a court-created decision that affects the ad­
missibility of testimonial evidence and that's all it is . . . .  The only consequence of your talk­
ing to somebody who has invoked his rights is we will not be able to use his statement in the 
case in chief in trial against him."). 
184. As Davies explains, there is a sharp discontinuity in liability when a sanctioning 
penalty is in place. Actors nearing the line separating permissible and forbidden conduct will 
not balance costs and benefits in the margin, but will tend to conform to the rule. See Davies, 
supra note 182, at 1290-92. Here, especially, Davies heavily draws upon the work of Robert 
Cooter. See id. at 1291 nn.65-69 and accompanying text; Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanc­
tions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984). 
185. See Davies, supra note 182, at 1296-97, 1314-15. 
186. Applying Davies' theory, it may be that Miranda's legal obligation is not backed by 
a suffidently strong penalty to gain the incentive effects of characterizing the exclusionary 
rule as a sanction instead of a price. If the sanction is not strong, actors nearing the line be­
tween permissible and impermissible conduct will not be deterred from simply balancing 
their own costs and benefits in the margin. 
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purpose.187 For this to prove a realistic deterrent, however, courts 
would have to be willing to find involuntariness far more frequently 
than at present. In Henry v. Kernan, the Ninth Circuit seemed to un­
derstand the powerful psychological impact of questioning over a 
Miranda invocation, telling a suspect that he can have an attorney and 
then affirmatively denying the request for one.188 But unless many 
other courts find statements involuntary on similar facts, this will be 
unlikely to alter the way that many officers conduct stationhouse in­
terrogations. Indeed, law enforcement training was not substantially 
modified after the court of appeals decided Henry. 
A more plausible candidate for change agent is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
As we have seen, the ruling in Butts appears to have prompted many 
state and local officials to alter their training. Even so, it is difficult to 
conclude that the risk of civil rights liability - or more precisely, po­
lice training about the risk of civil rights liability - can alone trans­
form interrogation practices. Few suspects who are questioned "out­
side Miranda" are likely to sue police; the suspects rarely will be 
sympathetic plaintiffs, and the amount of damages will probably be 
small.189 Further, departments will most likely indemnify the defendant 
officers, making the possibility of financial loss for any individual offi­
cer quite slim. The risk of § 1983 liability, however, is much more apt 
to alter police behavior in the stationhouse if it encourages sheriffs, 
police chiefs, and department supervisors to follow Miranda (perhaps 
in an effort to avoid municipal liability, the cost of defending lawsuits, 
or humiliation), and if these leaders endeavor to make compliance 
with Miranda a departmental norm. 
Training is not likely to change longstanding interrogation prac­
tices within a law enforcement agency without substantial reinforce­
ment, particularly if officers understand that courts will still allow lim­
ited use of an "outside Miranda" statement. If supervisors wish to 
imbue respect for Miranda, they must themselves take Miranda seri­
ously and signal that they prefer their officers to honor an invocation, 
even when doing so means losing an opportunity to gain useful infor­
mation or evidence. And the message must be reinforced, if necessary, 
through discipline of errant officers. The risk of §1983 liability may in­
fluence conduct within a department, but ultimately a change in cul­
ture must be brought on by police themselves. 
187. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
188. See 197 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the officer "took unfair advan­
tages" of the compelling pressures inherent in a custodial interrogation, and that " [a]ny 
minimally trained police officer should have known such pressure was improper and likely to 
produce involuntary statements"). 
189. Cf. Perrin et al., supra note 87, at 739-40 (discussing why few victims of Fourth 
Amendment violations sue under § 1983). 
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Fieldwork seems to support this conclusion. In the early 1960s, 
Jerome Skolnick closely observed officers in the Oakland Police De­
partment.190 His observations took place less than a decade after Cali­
fornia adopted an exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment viola­
tions. 191 Skolnick concluded that the norms within police organizations 
"are more powerful than court decisions in shaping police behavior 
and that actually the process of interaction between the two is what 
accounts ultimately for how police behave."192 From 
Skolnick's perspective, as long as an officer could justify a search to 
organizational superiors, the worst the officer could expect from an 
illegal search would be the loss of a conviction. Further, if the search 
turned up contraband, the "moral burden" would shift to the suspect 
and the illegality of the search would likely be tempered by the dis­
covery of the evidence.193 Between 1984 and 1988, Skolnick and his 
colleague, Jonathan Simon, conducted additional observations in 
Oakland. They concluded that officers' adherence to the Fourth 
Amendment had improved significantly.194 They credited the change 
to procedures throughout "the policing enterprise" designed to en­
force the values of the Fourth Amendment and noted that " [t]he idea 
of enforcing the Fourth Amendment has become normalized."195 
Training in departmental and legal rules was an important part of the 
change, but it was only a part.196 At about the same time that Simon 
and Skolnick returned to Oakland, Myron Orfield Jr. surveyed law en­
forcement officers in Chicago; 95% of the responding officers stated 
that police sometimes lied in court to avoid suppression.197 More re-
190. His observations are published in JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT 
TRIAL (3d ed. 1994). 
191. California adopted its rule in People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955), six years 
before the United States Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and 
applied the exclusionary rule to all the states. 
192. SKOLNICK, supra note 190, at 214. 
193. Id. at 215. 
194. See Jonathan Simon & Jerome H. Skolnick, Federalism, the Exclusionary Rule, and 
the Police, in POWER DIVIDED: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FEDERALISM 
75, 80 (Harry N. Scheiber & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 1989). 
195. Id.; see also SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF 
D ISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950-1990 at 152-53 (1993) (describing how agency offi­
cials develop their own group norms about how things should be done, which are highly re­
sistant to externally imposed changes). 
196. In addition to police training, other important parts of the change in departmental 
norms included: greater involvement of prosecutors with police; increased visibility of police 
practices; police managers' acceptance of legal norms as a mechanism for controlling line 
officers; and use of suppression hearings to reinforce police appreciation for legal proce­
dures. See Simon & Skolnick, supra note 194, at 80-85. 
197. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An 
Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI . L. REV. 1016, 1049 n.128 (1987). 
The question was whether the respondents knew of any case in which a judge has "disbe­
lieved police testimony at a suppression hearing." Id. A subsequent question asked how of-
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cently, Orfield surveyed judges, prosecutors and public defenders in 
Chicago. He reported that judges and public defenders believe that 
perjury is the major factor limiting the deterrent effect of the exclu­
sionary rule.198 Further, 38% of his respondents think that police su­
pervisors encourage perjury, and 67% of respondents believe that su­
pervisors tolerate perjury.199 These reports confirm that culture and 
leadership do matter. 
If improper interrogation practices will not end without a change 
in departmental culture, direction from the top is particularly impor­
tant. It is significant that a number of agency heads issued orders after 
Butts, instructing officers not to question "outside Miranda." Whether 
these orders actually become norms internalized by detectives and su­
pervisors who work in the stationhouse will depend upon continuing 
training and reinforcement at all levels of the agency. 
Finally, one might explore whether it is possible to determine the 
impact of Dickerson apart from Butts. Dickerson confirms the view, 
expressed in Butts, that Miranda imposes affirmative obligations. Sev­
eral agencies have instructed officers to comply with Miranda after 
Dickerson. And, certainly, Butts would not remain on the books had 
Dickerson come out the other way. Yet the language of many of the 
training materials leaves the strong impression that, but for the possi­
bility of civil liability, training would not have changed. 
B. Section 1983 Litigation After Dickerson 
If it is true that the prospect of civil rights liability significantly en­
courages police to comply with Miranda's commands, we should ask 
whether Dickerson will facilitate this use of the civil rights laws. 
Prior to Dickerson, most courts rejected efforts to assess liability 
for Miranda violations under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. The statute establishes a cause of action for state actors who 
deprive people of rights "secured by the Constitution and laws."200 As 
ten judges were "right in disbelieving police testimony"; no officer answered "never." Id. at 
1050 n.129. 
198. See Orfield, supra note 87, at 98. 
199. Id. at 108. According to Orfield, 29% of the respondents believe that police superi­
ors discourage perjury, but that many in this category suggested that the efforts at discour­
agement were pro forma at best. Id. at 109. 
200. Section 1983 provides, in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1995). Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), provides a counterpart for people whose constitutional rights 
have been violated by federal officials. 
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Susan Klein and others explain, the Supreme Court's characterization 
of Miranda as "prophylactic" - arguably "nonconstitutional" - has 
been a main obstacle to using the civil rights law to enforce Miranda;201 
the federal courts have generally ruled that the failure to administer 
Miranda warnings or honor an invocation of the right to counsel is not 
itself cognizable under § 1983.202 Another obstacle has been the posi­
tion taken by several circuits that a Fifth Amendment violation occurs 
only after a statement is introduced in court.203 This would limit the 
utility of §1983 by restricting its application to cases where an accused 
was questioned in violation of Miranda and was subsequently indicted 
or tried. 
Dickerson may well lead courts to revisit the first (though not the 
second) of these obstacles to civil rights liability. Dickerson acknowl-
201. See Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination 
Clause and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 421-22 (1994) (noting, how­
ever, other obstacles to the application of § 1983); see also Martin R. Gardner, Section 1983 
Actions Under Miranda: A Critical View of the Right to A void Interrogation, 30 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1277, 1294-97 (1993) (noting the cases that hold that Miranda is not a "right" guaran­
teed by the Constitution, and so a violation cannot be raised under § 1983). 
202. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that fail­
ure to warn or honor an invocation violates only a prophylactic rule, and does not support a 
§ 1983 suit); Deshawn E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 346 (2d Cir. 1998) (no liability under § 1983 
for failure to give Miranda warnings); Mahan v. Plymouth County House of Corrections, 64 
F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1995) (same); Neighbour v. Covert, 68 F.3d 1508, 1510 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(same); Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1256 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); Lucero v. Gunter, 17 
F.3d 1347, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1994) (same); Brock v. Logan County Sheriff's Dep't of Ark., 3 
F.3d 1215, 1217 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1244 (9th Cir.) (no 
cause of action for "benign" questioning in violation of Miranda), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 868 
(1992); Warren v. City of Lincoln, Nebraska, 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir.) (en bane) (no 
liability for failure to warn or honor invocation), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989); Bennett 
v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976) (same); see also Hutsell v. Sayre, 5 F.3d 996, 
1005 n.13 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Hensley with approval for the proposition that "a Miranda 
violation, without additional evidence of police coercion giving rise to a constitutional viola­
tion, does not state a cause of action under § 1983"), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1119 (1994); Hen­
sley v. Carey, 818 F.2d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Bennett with approval), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 965 (1987). 
203. Compare Deshawn E., 156 F.3d at 348 (noting that a Miranda violation that 
amounts to actual coercion based on outrageous governmental conduct can be basis for § 
1983 suit, even though statement was not used in court), Weaver v. Brenner, 40 F.3d 527, 535 
(2d Cir. 1994) (liability where statement introduced at any criminal proceeding), and 
Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1242-43 (holding that plaintiff can allege Fifth Amendment cause of ac­
tion even though statement was not used in court), with Giuffre, 31 F.3d at 1256 (agreeing 
with dissent in Cooper), Wiley v. Doory, 14 F.3d 993, 998 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that privi­
lege against self-incrimination is not violated until evidence is admitted in a criminal case), 
and Davis v. City of Charleston, Missouri, 827 F.2d 317, 322 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding no li­
ability for failure to give Miranda warnings where statement not introduced at trial). 
Cases holding that a Fifth Amendment violation may occur only when a statement is 
actually introduced at trial seem contrary to decisions such as New Jersey v. Portash, 440 
U.S. 450 (1979) (affirming reversal of conviction where defendant stayed off the stand be­
cause of threatened impeachment use of immunized testimony), and Lefkowitz v. 
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) (striking down statute that divested official of his political 
office after he invoked the Fifth Amendment; no criminal charges were filed). 
My own view is that a Fifth Amendment violation occurs in the stationhouse but may 
occur again in court. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 179-81. 
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edges the "prophylactic" label, but expressly rejects the Fourth 
Circuit's conclusion "that the protections announced in Miranda are 
not constitutionally required."204 Dickerson calls Miranda's procedures 
a mandatory constitutional "rule," which Justice Scalia claims is some­
thing short of a "right." While the majority's failure to find that a 
breach of Miranda is a per se Fifth Amendment violation may be 
driven by efforts to retain Miranda's current exclusionary rule,205 the 
issue here is whether this matters in applying § 1983.206 
Dickerson sheds some light on the issue by acknowledging the 
Court's earlier holding in Withrow v. Williams,201 that Miranda viola­
tions may be raised on federal habeas corpus. The federal habeas cor­
pus statute provides relief for people held "in custody in violation of 
the Constitution or laws . . .  of the United States."208 According to 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Withrow "obviously assumes that Miranda is 
of constitutional origin."209 There is a strong argument that a manda­
tory "rule" that is "of constitutional origin" is indeed a "right" "se­
cured by the Constitution." If someone convicted in violation of 
Miranda is in custody "in violation of the Constitution," a person de­
nied the protections of Miranda ought to be deemed denied a "right" 
"secured by the Constitution." It is uncertain how this question will 
now play out in the circuits, though Dickerson certainly augments the 
argument in favor of using § 1983 to vindicate Miranda.210 
204. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2333 (2000). 
205. See supra notes 77�83 and accompanying text. 
206. The question clearly weighs on the mind of Justice Scalia, who asked during the 
Dickerson argument: "Now, do you think that a policeman who fails to Mirandize the sus­
pect, obtains a confession without having Mirandized them and then introduces that confes­
sion in court, is subject to suit? Do you know of any suit that has ever been brought?" 
Transcript of Oral Argument, Dickerson v. United States, 2000 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 41, at 
*2-3 (Apr. 19, 2000). 
207. 507 U.S. 680 (1993). 
208. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 
209. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333 n.3. 
210. One additional point bears mentioning. Evan Caminker has suggested that, under 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), Congress might lack the power to impose civil 
liability upon police officers for interrogations that violate Miranda. When Congress enacts 
laws to remedy or prevent constitutional violations, "[t)here must be a congruence and pro­
portionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that 
end." Id. at 520. Dickerson should ease the burden of establishing congruence and propor­
tionality. By rejecting the characterization of Miranda's procedures as nonconstitutional 
prophylactic rules - and, particularly, by its treatment of Withrow - the Court made it 
more apparent that civil rights lawsuits for Miranda violations are suits to remedy the spe­
cific denial of constitutional rights. Thus, the civil rights remedy would be directly based 
upon constitutional violations as defined by the Court and City of Boerne should prove no 
obstacle. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-86 (2000) (finding that a stat­
ute failed to meet the congruence and proportionality test because it prohibited substantially 
more employment decisions than would be held unconstitutional under the Court's prece­
dents). Further, to the extent that the laws permit damage actions (as opposed to actions 
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief), there should be little difficulty establishing propor-
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There is another useful way of thinking about Miranda and 
§ 1983, however. While the courts of appeals have thus far not been 
kind to the claim that Miranda violations standing alone are cogniza­
ble under § 1983, most would agree that officers and cities may be 
sued for using coercion to obtain a statement.21 1  Yet a failure to advise 
a suspect of the right to remain silent or to speak with a lawyer has 
long been held to be probative of actual coercion. In Davis v. North · 
Carolina,212 the Court ruled a confession involuntary under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, stating: 
[T]hat a defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent or of his 
right respecting counsel at the outset of interrogation, as is now required 
by Miranda, is a significant factor in considering the voluntariness of 
statements later made. This factor has been recognized in several of our 
prior decisions dealing with standards of voluntariness. Thus, the fact 
that Davis was never effectively advised of his rights gives added weight 
to the other circumstances described below which made his confessions 
involuntary.213 
In Butts, the Ninth Circuit found that the failure to comply with 
Miranda may be a significant part of a civil rights plaintiff's proof of 
coercion, and that officers who deliberately question "outside 
Miranda" are not entitled to qualified immunity.214 By reaffirming the 
connection between Miranda and the Constitution, Dickerson 
strengthens these conclusions. After Butts and Dickerson, it should be 
much easier for a civil rights plaintiff to get to trial if she was ques­
tioned in violation of Miranda and there is at least some additional 
evidence tending to show coercion. The plaintiff should be able to 
avoid summary judgment - a Miranda violation should, standing 
tionality. Finally, the civil rights remedy would be directed only to state actors, police offi­
cers and municipalities that function "under color of' state law. See United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-26 (2000) (holding that a statute directed at private individuals 
was not congruent and proportional). 
211. See, e.g. , Weaver v. Brenner, 40 F.3d 527, 535 (2d Cir. 1994) (§ 1983 action may be 
brought for use or derivative use of coerced confession in any criminal proceeding); Rex v. 
Teeples, 753 F.2d 840, 843 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that "[e)xtracting an involuntary confes­
sion by coercion is a due process violation," actionable under § 1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
967 (1985) . 
212. 384 U.S. 737 (1966). 
213. Id. at 740-41 (citations omitted); see also Withrow, 507 U.S. at 693-94 (noting that 
courts look at the totality of circumstances to determine whether a confession was voluntary, 
and those circumstances "include the failure of police to advise the defendant of his rights to 
remain silent and to have counsel present during custodial interrogation"); Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 399-401 (1978) (finding a statement to be involuntary based in part 
upon the fact that the accused's request for counsel was ignored). 
214. See Cal. Att'ys for Crim. Justice v. Butts, 195 F.2d 1039, 1047-49 (9th Cir. 1999); see 
also Rex, 753 F.2d at 843-44 (finding that the plaintiff had stated a civil rights cause of action 
for coercion where, among other things, he alleged a Miranda violation). 
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alone, establish at least a genuine issue of material fact215 as to actual 
coercion - the ultimate question of actual coercion should go to the 
jury, and the defendant officers should be denied qualified immunity. 
For this reason, Butts and Dickerson together substantially increase 
the threat of civil liability (or, certainly, the threat of costly litigation) 
for officers and departments that continue to question "outside 
Miranda." One hopes that this increased threat will be instrumental in 
encouraging police chiefs, sheriffs, and supervisors to change depart­
mental norms. 
CONCLUSION 
Dickerson v. United States left Miranda standing, but with all of the 
exceptions and modifications that have been crafted during the last 
thirty-five years. As we have seen, Miranda's exclusionary rule does 
not give officers much of an incentive to cease questioning a suspect 
who invokes the right to counsel or the right to remain silent. Officers 
who comply will gain no further information. On the other hand, in­
terrogators who continue to question may obtain statements useful for 
impeachment and they may learn about additional evidence or wit­
nesses. For these reasons, police in California (and perhaps elsewhere) 
have developed the practice of questioning "outside Miranda." 
This Article explores whether Dickerson and other recent Miranda 
decisions may bring an end to this practice. An examination of state­
wide and local police training materials shows that the risk of civil li­
ability appears to be at least as significant as Dickerson in leading po­
lice agencies to instruct personnel to comply with Miranda. Miranda's 
exclusionary rule, even after Dickerson, remains so weak that law en­
forcement agencies need the additional incentive of the threat of civil 
rights liability to follow Miranda's procedures. Dickerson is, never­
theless, important because it confirms Miranda's constitutional foun­
dation and may enhance the ability of civil rights plaintiffs to deter 
deliberate violations of Miranda. 
Whether the practice of questioning "outside Miranda" will actu­
ally cease in California remains to be seen. Legislative efforts to end 
the practice have not yet proved successful. Training is necessary but 
not sufficient to lead officers to comply with Miranda. Miranda re­
mains on the law books. Whether it will survive in the stationhouse 
will depend upon the inclination of sheriffs, police chiefs and supervi­
sory personnel to make compliance with Miranda the norm in their 
departments. That inclination may be nourished by the palpable threat 
of § 1983 liability but, whatever its source, it must ultimately come 
215. See FED. R. Clv. P. 56(c) ("The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings . . .  show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."). 
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from within the departments themselves. We cannot expect police of­
ficers to take Miranda seriously unless their leaders do as well. 
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APPENDIX A: 
SAMPLE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT REQUEST . 
SENT TO A POLICE DEPARTMENT 
August 17, 2000 
[Name and Address] 
Dear Chief __ _ 
I am writing to request release of public records, writings and 
documents pursuant to the Public Records Act, Cal. Gov. Code 
§§6250, et seq. 
I am researching how police interrogation practices, and how liti­
gation over the admissibility of statements, have been affected by four 
recent court decisions: People v. Peevy, 17 Cal.4th 1184, 73 
Cal.Rptr.2d 865 (1998), Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 
1999), California A ttorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039 
(9th Cir. 1999), and Dickerson v. United States, _ U.S. _, 120 S.Ct. 
2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000). I am particularly interested in the prac­
tice of questioning "outside Miranda," and in any training about that 
practice in light of these cases. I therefore ask that you provide the 
following: 
1 .  All training bulletins, manuals, videotapes, policies, 
seminar materials, case summaries and other docu­
ments relating to officers' duties under Miranda v. 
A rizona, that are dated or that were distributed on or 
after May 7, 1998 (the date People v. Peevy was de­
cided); 
2. All training bulletins, manuals, videotapes, policies, 
seminar materials, case summaries and other docu­
ments that discuss or refer to People v. Peevy, 17 
Cal.4th 1184, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 (1998), Henry v. 
Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 1999), California 
A ttorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039 
(9th Cir. 1999), or Dickerson v. United States, _ U.S. 
_ ,  120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000); 
3. All training bulletins, manuals, videotapes, policies, 
seminar materials, case summaries and other docu­
ments that discuss or refer td the ability of officers to 
question a suspect in custody after he or she has in­
voked the right to remain silent or the right to counsel 
(i.e., question "outside Miranda"). 
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Please note that I am not seeking copies of any police reports or 
motions or briefs in any individual cases. I am not seeking to obtain 
any reports of any individual interrogations. Rather, I am only seeking 
to determine, broadly, how sworn personnel have been trained in light 
of these decisions. 
I request that you determine whether you will comply with this re­
quest within ten days, as required by Cal. Gov. Code §6253. Please tell 
me whether there is any copying fee for these materials, and I will 
promptly provide payment. Finally, should you determine not to make 
all of the requested documents available, I request that you indicate 
which items you will not turn over for inspection and specify the rea­
sons for refusal to comply with this request, pursuant to Cal. Gov. 
Code §6255. 
Thank you very much for your assistance. Please call me with any 
questions at all about this request. 
Very truly yours, 
/s/ 
Charles D. Weisselberg 
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APPENDIX B: 
AGENCY RESPONSES TO PUBLIC RECORDS ACT REQUESTS 
County Agencies 
(R=Agency responded to request) 
Responses Received From 
County Population as District of April 2000216 Attorney 
Alameda 1 ,443,741 R 
Fresno 799,407 R 
Humboldt 126,518 R 
Kern 661,645 
Los Angeles 9,519,338 R 
Orange 2,846,289 R 
Riverside 1,545,387 R 
Sacramento 1 ,223,499 
San Bernardino 1 ,709,434 R 
San Diego 2,813,833 R 
San Francisco 776,733 
San Joaquin 563,598 
Santa Clara 1 ,682,585 R 
Shasta 163,256 R 
Total 25,875,263 10/14 
Response rate for District Attorneys: 71 % .  












216. Population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau and are available at http://fact­
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City Police Departments 
(R=Agency responded to request) 


































217. Population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau and are available at http://fact­
finder/census.gov (last visited Apr. 20, 2001 ). 
